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All propositions intelligible to us, whether or not they primarily concern 
things only known to us by description, are composed wholly of 
constituents with which we are acquainted, for a constituent with which 
we are not acquainted is unintelligible to us. Bertrand Russell, 1910. 
This thesis explores modal knowledge. Modal knowledge is such that we are often confounded 
when we are asked to present justifications for it. This is due to (1) the fundamental role 
acquaintance plays in the formation of knowledge, and (2) the seeming absence of acquaintance 
with modal facts. Since modal propositions are intelligible to us, then given Russell’s theory, 
modal propositions are composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted despite 
(2). In this thesis, I argue that we can construct an acquaintance theory for modal facts, and I call 
such theory ‘modal acquaintance’. Since acquaintance is sufficient as justification for 
knowledge, then our modal knowledge is justified through modal acquaintance.   
Chapter 1 introduces modal nihilism and modal scepticism as objections to modal 
knowledge. It poses the research question, which serves as guide to the analyses and structure of 
the research and it provides background assumptions. Notable among the assumptions is the 
adoption of the Lewisian version of modal realism as the theoretical framework of this research. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the role of acquaintance in knowledge formation and explains that 
acquaintance could be understood in two senses. The first is the standard Russellian sense and 
arguably the one absent by default in any function from this world to possible worlds due to its 
requirement of sense-data as object. The second is not as rigid as the first in that it allows more 
entities which are internal to the subject to be objects of acquaintance. Among these internal 
entities, ‘thoughts’ were isolated as the closest identifier of modal facts, precisely because the 
truth of modal thoughts depends on whether or not they correspond to modal facts. This 
correspondence allows for the construction of modal acquaintance. 
Chapter 3 presents accounts of how we have modal knowledge. The presentation begins 
with Lewis on how we know the contents of his possible worlds. Then, I consider some recent 
accounts of modal epistemology. The accounts include Yablo and Chalmers in the conceivability 
camp; Williamson and Hill in the counterfactual camp; and Bealer in the understanding camp.   
Chapter 4 explains why acquaintance provides a straightforward way to justifying modal 
knowledge. Since Lewis urges us to take more seriously the metaphysics of modality than its 
epistemology, attention shifted to the recent account of modal epistemology. The recent accounts 
were incorporated into the Lewisian modal realism before identifying which among them 
contains an account of modal justification. They were all found wanting, hence, modal 
acquaintance was put forward as a better alternative. The theory of ‘threshold’ was developed as 
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The causal connection we have with objects plays a role in our knowledge of them. Some might 
claim that we have knowledge of objects only because we have this causal connection with them, 
but that is debatable. However debatable this claim might be, there seems to be an inescapable 
route for what we know, a route defined by ‘causal connection’. Lewis states; “the trouble is that 
knowledge requires some sort of causal connection between the knower and the subject matter of 
his knowledge”.1  
For a long time, modality – our reasoning with possibility and necessity – received no 
formalization, partly because causal connection is absent and partly because no one really knew 
what to do with modality. Consequently, after Aristotle dwelt briefly on it, modality did not enter 
philosophical analysis for a considerable period. Kanger in 1957 (and shortly after him Hintikka 
in the same year) realized that this could be corrected since modality plays a definitive role in 
theoretical formulations not only in philosophy but in other disciplines as well. Subsequently, 
many other philosophers contributed to the formalization of modality. Notable among them was 
Kripke (1959) who proved a completeness theorem for modal logic, thereby, providing 
semantics of modal logic. Following on from Kripke, Lewis (1986) with his version of modal 
realism reduced modal facts to non-modal facts by introducing a realism of possible worlds. 
Despite the success of Kripke and Lewis in modal philosophy, the epistemology of 
modality remained a concern. How we acquire modal knowledge remained a source of 
scepticism, as it would appear that we do not to require acquaintance with modal objects2 in 
order to have knowledge about them. If this is correct, how do we know the truth-values of 
modal statements, if ever? What justifies knowledge claims of modalized statements? In his 
analysis on why the concrete possible worlds of Lewis fail to guarantee modal knowledge, 
Skyrms (1976) observes that: 
If possible worlds are supposed to be the same sorts of things as our 
actual world; if they are supposed to exist in as concrete and robust a 
sense as our own; if they are supposed to be as real as Afghanistan, or the 
                                                 
1 D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986, p. 109. 
2 ‘Modal objects’ as used in this paper are populations of possible worlds. It is a class term for both possibilities and 
necessities. I also assume a synonymy between ‘modal objects’ and ‘modal facts’.  
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centre of the sun or Cygnus A, then they require the same sort of 
evidence for their existence as other constituents of physical reality.3   
   Skyrms rightly notes that for modal objects to enjoy the kind of existence Lewis ascribes 
to them, they require the sort of evidence that guarantees the existence of actual objects. Such 
evidence is usually a causal connection between the subject and the object. However, we do not 
have this kind of evidence for modal objects. In other words, we may say, “Since there are no 
ways to ascertain the existence of modal objects given the lack of empirical evidence, modal 
knowledge should be taken with the proverbial pinch of a salt”. An extremist view could go 
further and reject modal knowledge altogether. It might say, “Knowledge needs acquaintance, 
modal knowledge lacks acquaintance, therefore, there is no modal knowledge”. Consequently, 
we have modal nihilism and modal scepticism as the positions respectively denying that ‘there is 
modal knowledge’, and that ‘we can have modal knowledge’. In this introductory chapter, these 
two positions are critically considered in section 1.2. The problem question, which this research 
seeks to answer, is formulated in section 1.3 from this critical survey. The background 
assumptions, which this research will make, are highlighted in section 1.4 and the chapter 
concludes in section 1.5. 
1.2 Modal nihilism and modal scepticism 
The concept modality is usually divided into commonsensical and philosophical modality. 
Commonsensical modality is the everyday usage of modality. Philosophical modality, on the 
other hand, is the attempt of philosophers at describing the nature, identity, and dependence 
relations between objects, events or properties used in modal contexts. More strongly, 
philosophical modality is the outcome of philosophers’ attempts to explain commonsensical 
modality. This research is concerned with the second – philosophical modality – not the first 
kind. No one objects to commonsensical modality or deny that we have such knowledge.4 The 
attempt to describe absolute possibilities and necessities perplexes the minds of modal nihilists 
and modal sceptics.  
 Consequently, the reservations of the modal nihilists and the modal sceptics revolve 
around philosophical modality. The worries of the nihilists and the sceptics are founded on the 
same premise: “perception constitutes the main source of knowledge, and perception only gives 
us access to what is actually the case, not to what is necessarily the case or what is possibly the 
case”. Moving on from this premise, the nihilists and the sceptics arrived at two distinct 
conclusions respectively in that, while the nihilists deny the existence of philosophical modal 
knowledge, the sceptics deny our ability to have philosophical modal knowledge. 
                                                 
3 B. Skyrms, ‘Possible Worlds, Physics and Metaphysics’, p. 326. 
4 In my usage, modal nihilism is not ‘modal eliminativism’. Modal eliminativism is the view that modalities are 
unexplainable and non-truth-conditional. For discussions on modal eliminativism, see S. Blackburn, 1987 and H. 
Field, 1989. Some (T. Sider, 2003, p. 186) even place Quine (1953) into this category. I found only one mention that 
comes closest to ‘modal nihilism’. This is in Sauchelli (2012). He calls it ‘global modal scepticism’ and it is 
supposed to be the sceptical attitude towards all our modal beliefs. See, A. Sauchelli, ‘Modal Scepticism, 
Unqualified Modality, and Modal Kinds’, 2012, p. 404. 
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 To clarify the distinction between the modal nihilists and the modal sceptics properly, the 
following scenario and its corresponding explanation are offered.  
Scenario: There is a tree in Jerry’s garden, and the tree is twenty feet 
tall. Jerry has causal connection with the tree, hence, he knows that the 
tree is twenty feet tall. Unfortunately, due to the tree’s very tall height, it 
interferes occasionally with the electricity cable passing behind Jerry’s 
house, so that his electricity occasionally trips. Complaining about this 
problem to his new neighbour John, John said, “If the tree were five feet 
tall, you would not have had this problem”.  
Explanation: Either John can explain his statement to Jerry or he cannot. 
If he can, then he has philosophical modal knowledge because he would 
be able to explain to Jerry exactly what his statement means. He would 
be able to explain his statement in non-modal terms. If he cannot explain 
his statement, then he only has commonsensical modal knowledge, in 
which case, he cannot explain it in non-modal terms.  
On the one hand, the modal nihilists deny the existence of philosophical modal 
knowledge. For them, all there is to modal knowledge is the commonsensical kind; there is no 
higher kind with which we explain the commonsensical kind. On the other hand, the modal 
sceptics only deny that we can have philosophical modal knowledge. Unlike the modal nihilists, 
the modal sceptics believe that both kinds of modal knowledge exist, but while we can have the 
first kind, we cannot have the second kind. As far as the modal sceptics are concerned, whatever 
John says beyond his statement, perhaps as an explanation, is philosophically unimportant.  
1.2.1 Modal nihilism 
I take the position of Melia (2003) in answering the modal nihilists.  
Unfortunately, abandoning modality is not as easy as it might at first 
seem. Modality is ubiquitous in […] our scientific and philosophical 
theorizing. In abandoning the modal we abandon many things that we 
naturally accept and think of as being trivial or 
uncontentious…Philosophers who dare to find fault with such natural 
and apparently uncontentious truths had better have good reason for 
doing so…Philosophers who abandon such talk and thought find 
themselves at odds with common sense.5  
 The modal nihilists, if any, are simply confused in denying the existence of philosophical 
modal knowledge. Melia explains that apart from the pervasiveness of modality in our everyday 
reasoning, science and philosophical theories also employ modality. According to him, science 
normally ascribes dispositional properties to various objects, for instance, that salt is soluble, that 
hydrogen is flammable, and that uranium has a tendency to decay.6 These are facts about the 
                                                 
5 Melia, Modality, 2003, pp. 4-6 
6 Ibid, p. 6. 
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objects’ tendencies or capacities; they are not about how the objects actually are, they are modal 
facts. In addition, Melia avers that in elementary logic, one of the main concepts is the notion of 
validity, and the definition provided is traditionally in modal terms. If asked what it is for an 
argument to be valid, philosophers normally answer, “An argument is valid, if it is not possible 
for the premises to be true and the conclusion false”.7  
If the role of modality, in our everyday reasoning, in scientific and in philosophical 
theorizations, does not make the modal nihilists rethink their position, the following should. 
When modality rose to prominence in the second half of the twentieth century, many ancient 
philosophical problems were resolved.8 For example, the positivist movement, with the aid of the 
verification principle, ruled that metaphysical analyses are meaningless. The verification 
principle holds that “if a proposition cannot be known or verified or tested, it is meaningless”. 
Intuitively, there seems to be something terribly wrong with this principle, but there was no 
better way to show this fault, other than labelling the verification principle as a metaphysical 
principle, which cannot be verified. Unfortunately, a tu quoque response to criticisms is 
fallacious. However, when modality rose to prominence, it became relatively easy to point out 
that knowability, verifiability, and testability are all modal notions and that their modal 
characters are essential. By saying their modal characters are essential, we mean the knowable, 
the verifiable, and the testable cannot be replaced with the known, verified and tested 
respectively; and obviously, we cannot verify all the knowables, the verifiables and the testables. 
The verification principle thus failed to verify itself. Without giving a tu quoque response, 
modality provided a better way to show that the verification principle was inherently flawed.  
While Melia’s position invokes commonsensical rather than philosophical modal 
knowledge, the case of the verification principle arguably invokes philosophical modal 
knowledge. Later, in section 1.5, a stronger position is taken that makes a reductio out of the 
sceptic’s position who thinks we can only have commonsensical modal knowledge by arguing 
that commonsensical modal knowledge leads to philosophical modal knowledge. Nonetheless, 
evidence provided by Melia’s position and the case of the verification principle shows that to 
claim philosophical modal knowledge is non-existent is to eschew many facts about the actual 
world. Our everyday reasoning, scientific methodology and basic philosophical tasks are replete 
with modality and there is no explaining their modal character without recourse to philosophical 
modality. Therefore, to say that the kind of knowledge required for John to explain his modal 
statement is non-existent is an absurd position. Modal nihilism is absurd.  
                                                 
7 Melia immediately makes it clear that anyone familiar with advanced logic would frown at such definition. Such 
person might give a definition of validity, which eschews modality: “an argument is valid if and only if there is no 
model M such that the premises are true-in-M and the conclusion is false-in-M”. However, Melia counters that such 
definition is problematic because (1) it is restrictive to only those languages for which logicians have developed a 
model theory, and (2) it does not capture the intuitive notion of validity, which makes validity important in the first 
place. See, ibid, p. 7. 
8 The following example is from Melia (2003). He also highlights five other examples to show how modality helped 
in the solving of problems and providing analyses that were pivotal in the developmental history of philosophy in 
the 20th century. See, Modality, pp. 8-10.  
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There is another reason to consider modal nihilism absurd. Modal nihilism claims there is 
no philosophical modal knowledge because philosophical modal knowledge greatly departs from 
commonsense since causal connection is not an option.9 With recognition to Lewis (1973 and 
1986), philosophers now weigh their theories with common sense to determine the costs for 
holding such positions. Substantiating this point, Melia states, “of course, common sense is not 
the final arbiter of truth, but a departure from common sense is nevertheless a price to pay for 
one’s philosophy, and the greater the departure the greater the price. Of course, if it turns out that 
modality is incoherent or problematic, then, we will have strong reasons for revising our 
common-sense beliefs”.10 This move by Lewis, which Melia supports, is excellent, but it 
presents philosophy as the police of common sense, and here I disagree. 
Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue that the ‘at-all-cost’ preservation of common sense will 
be the death of metaphysics. According to them, science has shown repeatedly that our common 
sense beliefs are not always correct.11 Thus, the knack to preserve intuition and common sense in 
metaphysics should be discouraged. Ladyman and Ross are accurate in thinking this despite their 
canvassing for a naturalized metaphysics, which would not be metaphysics, as we know it. 
Philosophical modality does not conform to common sense quite comfortably but that does not 
make it any less reasonable. For more than eight decades, quantum mechanics has remained a 
philosophical nightmare. Yet, modern scientific experiments have experimentally verified 
quantum mechanics. Just as quantum mechanics, modality need not align with common sense to 
be reasonable. The absence of causal connection with the possible five-feet-tall tree and the lack 
of evidential support for John’s knowledge of the tree are not sufficient for denying the existence 
of explanations in the form of philosophical modal knowledge for John’s modal statement. 
Perhaps, if the modal nihilists would find another justification for their position besides the 
preservation of common sense and intuition, their arguments would be taken more seriously. 
1.2.2 Modal scepticism 
Modal scepticism12, on the other hand, is the position that we should not take philosophical 
modality seriously; that, philosophers ought not to concern themselves with it since modality (in 
its commonsensical form) is a mundane task. For the modal sceptics, modal knowledge abounds, 
but we cannot explain how we have it, that is, we cannot have philosophical modal knowledge. 
To understand the modal sceptics’ grievance against philosophical modality, let us analyse the 
concept itself. Philosophical modality divides into de dicto and de re modality. While de dicto 
modality refers to the truth of the whole proposition, de re modality refers to a particular thing 
having some modal properties. By way of illustration: the statement “possibly, the tree in Jerry’s 
                                                 
9 Here, I am tacitly responding to those nihilists, if any, that claim not only philosophical modal knowledge is non-
existent, but that commonsensical modal knowledge is also non-existent. 
10 Modality, p. 6. 
11 See, J. Ladyman and D. Ross, Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, pp. 12-15. 
12 Although Quine was the first to complain about the complications arising from modality in philosophical 
theorization, it was not until four decades after him that van Inwagen used the concept ‘modal scepticism’. As a 
result of this, van Inwagen is discussed before Quine in the below analysis. The goal is a systematic presentation of 
modal scepticism, hence the transposition of historical facts. 
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garden is five feet tall” is an example of de dicto modal statement. It says that the description of 
a tree being five feet tall is possible. The truth condition of the statement depends on the 
proposition. Whereas, the statement “the tree in Jerry’s garden is possibly five feet tall” is an 
example of de re modal statement. It says that there is a tree, whose height might possibly be five 
feet, that is, it is the tree having the modal property. The truth-condition of the statement depends 
on the tree.13 Van Inwagen is discussed for de dicto modality, and Quine for de re modality. 
1.2.2.1 Van Inwagen on de dicto modality 
Van Inwagen’s (1998) concern lies with the genus ‘possibility’ itself. He states; “…but what is 
this ‘possibility’ knowledge of which you are sceptical about? … Possible tout court. Possible 
simpliciter. Possible period.”14 In his view, the sense of ‘possibility’ used in metaphysical 
analyses is problematic because it seems impossible to explain what we mean by it.  
My own view is that we often do know modal propositions, ones that are 
of use to us in everyday life and in science and even in philosophy, but do 
not and cannot know (at least by the exercise of our own unaided powers) 
modal propositions that state matters of absolute possibilities. I have 
called this position ‘modal scepticism’.15  
According to him, the problem is that, in a bid to explain modal propositions of everyday 
life together with those of science and philosophy, we construct modal propositions of absolute 
possibilities, and this attempt is dubious because we cannot know this kind of modal 
propositions. He furthered that we can only know modal propositions of everyday life. It suffices 
to say that the modal sceptic has no problem with metaphysical possibilities because he already 
accepts their plausibility. What he has problem accepting is our knowledge of metaphysical 
possibilities. What is of importance to the modal sceptic, according to van Inwagen, is not 
whether John has the knowledge that the tree in Jerry’s garden could be five feet tall 
(commonsensical modal knowledge), but how John came to the knowledge that the tree could be 
five feet tall (philosophical modal knowledge). 
 For van Inwagen, the only candidate-answer is the construction of a possible scenario, 
according to which the modal claim is true. John would say he knows that the tree could have 
been five feet tall because he has constructed and examined intellectually a counterfactual 
scenario according to which the tree is five feet tall. Unfortunately, this only moves the matter a 
step backward. We now require how John knew that the counterfactual tree is five feet tall in the 
first place. In order to do this, van Inwagen continues, a second larger scenario, which includes 
the causal antecedents of the event in the original scenario, would have to be constructed. This is 
                                                 
13 This distinction is Sider’s which I find more clear-cutting. “In the de re sentence there is a variable in the scope of 
the modal operator … that is bound to a quantifier outside the scope of the operator whereas in the de dicto sentence 
no quantification into the scope of modal operators occurs”. According to Sider then, if we take L as representing 
the tree in Jerry’s garden, and F as the five-feet height of this tree, we can formalize the distinction between de re 
and de dicto modal statements as follows. De re: ∃x (Lx & ◊Fx). De dicto: ◊∃x (Lx & Fx). See, ‘Reductive Theories 
of Modality’, 2003, p. 183.  
14 Ibid, p. 72. 
15 Van Inwagen, ‘Modal Epistemology’, 1998, p. 69. Italics are mine. 
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because it remained doubtful whether constructing a scenario we knew to be possible would 
show us how we knew that something involved in the scenario was possible unless we can 
explain how we knew that the scenario itself was possible.  
The problem here is that the second scenario will, in turn, require a larger third scenario 
to show how the second functions. This third scenario will then require a fourth, which will, in 
turn, require a fifth, and so the process continues ad infinitum. This method of knowing, as van 
Inwagen points out, is useless in the justification of modal knowledge. Consequently, van 
Inwagen argues, if this method of knowing is the only option available to us and it is useless, 
then we can only have basic modal knowledge and we cannot have absolute modal knowledge. 
As we shall see later in section 3.3.1.1, this method contains a great deal of truth on the issue of 
modal epistemology, and for that reason, van Inwagen says his modal scepticism is given more 
strength. According to him, the part of the method that is correct is sufficient to justify modal 
scepticism since he has sufficiently shown that the method is useless.16 Consequently, van 
Inwagen concludes that we cannot have modal knowledge that states matters of absolute 
possibilities.17  
1.2.2.2 Quine on de re modality 
For Quine (1953), matters of metaphysical possibilities are incoherent. He argues that de re 
modal contexts are referentially opaque and consequently that quantification into such contexts 
yields metaphysical incoherence. His argument has two parts. The first part of his argument 
fleshes out this referential opacity and the second part shows that the absence of any satisfactory 
ontological basis for de re modal predication renders quantification into de re modal contexts 
metaphysically incoherent. Only the first part of his argument is important for the task at hand. 
The problem is that truth-value changes when we substitute a proper name with another 
singular term (a definite description) which refers to the same object within a de re modal 
context.18 Divers (2007), exhibits Quine’s argument. 
(1) 9 is identical to the number of planets    True 
(2) 9 is necessarily greater than 7     True 
(3) The number of planets is necessarily greater than 7  False 
For Quine, proper names are eliminable features of our language. Thus, if opacity is 
evident in de re modal contexts, it must be manifest at the level of quantification and predication. 
Thus, by existential generalization on (2)19 we have: 
(2*) (∃x) (x is necessarily greater than 7). 
                                                 
16 See, ‘Modal Epistemology’, pp. 75-77. The ‘method of knowing’ which van Inwagen picks on was Yablo’s 
(1993), I have skipped mentioning Yablo here only to introduce him later.  
17 Van Inwagen’s basic modal knowledge is my commonsensical modal knowledge and his absolute modal 
knowledge is my philosophical modal knowledge. 
18 See, J. Divers, Quinean Scepticism about De Re Modality after David Lewis, 2007, pp. 40-41. The following 
explanation of Quine is from the simplified analysis of Divers. I have adopted Divers analysis because it follows the 
de re classification of Sider (note 11 above). 
19 (1) is not a modal statement and so, it does not advance Quine’s argument. But (3) is a modal statement and so it 
should yield the same result as (2). Interestingly, it does and it is relatively easy to see how once the argument for 
(2) is understood. 
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In finding the truth-value of (2*) we are confounded when we ask which object is 
necessarily greater than 7. According to (2), that object is ‘9’, but according to (1), ‘9’ is also the 
object that is ‘the number of planets’. But if we say that the object which is ‘the number of 
planets’ is necessarily greater than 7, we conflict with the falsehood of (3). When we substitute 
the definite description ‘the number of planets’ with the proper name ‘9’ which refers to the 
same object, the truth-values of the sentence in which we are substituting changes: (3) that was 
initially false, is now true. Even though 9 is necessarily greater than 7, it is false that the number 
of planets – which is identical with 9 – is necessarily greater than 7. The argument implies that 
‘9’ and ‘the number of planets’ may not be co-referential in modal context, that is, there is at 
least one possible world in which they do not refer to the same object.  
Returning to the case study – John and the tree in Jerry’s garden –, the tree is a longifolia, 
and like any longifolia, it grows in its full maturity under normal chemical and physical 
conditions, to a height of at least ten feet and at most thirty feet, approximately. Due to this tall 
height, the longifolia bends in the wind and interferes with the electricity cable. Applying 
Quine’s argument here, ‘the longifolia in Jerry’s garden’ and ‘the tree that bends in the wind’ 
may not be co-referential in modal contexts. That is, in at least one possible world, the longifolia 
in Jerry’s garden and the tree that bends in the wind do not refer to the same object. If there is no 
certainty that John is referring to the longifolia in Jerry’s garden in his modal statement, we 
might as well claim like the sceptics that John has no philosophical modal knowledge.  
1.2.2.3 Synergizing van Inwagen and Quine 
Either van Inwagen is used to explain Quine or Quine used to explain van Inwagen. In both 
cases, the result is a clearer grasp of the problem the modal sceptic wants us to consider. Here, 
van Inwagen is employed to explain the position of Quine. For van Inwagen, John could only 
have philosophical modal knowledge that the longifolia in Jerry’s garden could be five feet tall if 
he had intellectually constructed and examined a scenario according to which the longifolia is 
five feet tall. The Lewisian modal realism (hereafter as LMR), explains how this is possible. 
According to LMR, this constructed scenario is a situation in a concrete possible world, and this 
possible world is a counterfactual to the actual world. In this possible world, there is a concrete 
longifolia, which is five feet tall, and the five-feet-tall longifolia is similar to the actual-longifolia 
in so many ways that it qualifies as a counterpart of the actual-longifolia.20 Using the notion of 
counterparts, modal properties are indexed to counterparts in possible worlds so that actual 
objects may have properties they do not have in actuality. Thus, the modal property of the actual-
longifolia being five feet tall is indexed to the counterpart-longifolia in the possible world.  
A clearer understanding of Quine would be as follows. The possible world, which has the 
intellectually constructed scenario of John as part, might be that world in which the tree in 
Jerry’s garden and the tree that bends in the wind are not co-referential. Stated differently, if the 
actual-longifolia is the tree that bends in the wind, and the counterpart-longifolia may not be the 
tree that bends in the wind, then the counterpart-longifolia and the actual-longifolia may not be 
                                                 
20 ‘Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic’, 1968, pp. 114-115; ‘Counterpart of Persons and their Bodies’, 
1971, pp. 205-206; On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986, p. 88.  
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the same objects. If this claim is plausible, then any inference that John could have made from 
his non-modal knowledge of the counterpart-longifolia to the philosophical modal knowledge 
about the actual-longifolia is dubious. By implication, John does not have the philosophical 
modal knowledge that the actual-longifolia could have been five feet tall.21 In this way, Quine’s 
position seems fatal to modal epistemology. Nevertheless, the same counterpart-theoretic 
analysis of Lewis is the key to a solution.22 For Lewis, the actual-longifolia and the counterpart-
longifolia are after all, not the same trees because counterpart relation is not an identity relation; 
it is a similarity relation. Thus, if John knows about the counterpart-longifolia, then given the 
close similarities between the counterpart-longifolia and the actual-longifolia, he can make valid 
inferences from the counterfactual to the actual. Having made this inference, John knows that the 
actual-longifolia could have been five feet tall. However, following the delimitations of LMR 
which holds that possible worlds are isolated,23 van Inwagen’s initial concern surfaces again: 
how does John know about the counterpart-longifolia in the first place? 
According to LMR, possible worlds are isolated from one another and from the actual 
world. Thus, John does not know about the counterpart-longifolia given the causal and 
spatiotemporal isolation of worlds from one another. This means that the causal history of the 
counterpart-longifolia, which led to its five feet height, is disconnected from what happens in our 
world and in any other possible world. Faced with this difficulty, we are back to where we 
began; the inescapable route of causal connection, which is absent in any function from this 
world to all Lewisian concrete worlds. If John could not have traveled to the possible world 
where the counterpart-longifolia exists, and neither could he have had any link, to the causal 
history of the counterpart-longifolia’s five feet height, then how did he know that the 
counterpart-longifolia is five feet tall? Thus, the modal sceptics claim that if John cannot explain 
how he came about this non-modal knowledge about the counterpart-longifolia then he surely 
cannot infer from the non-modal knowledge to the modal proposition about the actual-longifolia 
in Jerry’s garden.  
While van Inwagen implicitly consented to the plausibility of metaphysical possibilities but 
denied our knowledge of them, Quine went a little bit further to demonstrate how metaphysical 
possibilities are incoherent. If, according to Quine, metaphysical possibilities are incoherent, 
then, according to van Inwagen, it is logical that we cannot have philosophical modal 
knowledge, which states matters of absolute possibilities. Together, van Inwagen and Quine ask: 
“How do we have philosophical modal knowledge?” How does John know about the 
counterpart-longifolia? Therefore, unlike modal nihilism, we should take modal scepticism 
seriously.  
                                                 
21 One must pay attention to what the modal sceptics claim John lacks: he lacks the philosophical modal knowledge 
that the actual-longifolia is the same tree as the counterpart-longifolia with which he might explain his statement that 
the actual-longifolia could have been five feet tall. The modal sceptics do not claim John lacks the commonsensical 
modal knowledge that the actual-longifolia could have been five feet tall. 
22 See, Lewis, 1971 and Divers, 2007. 
23 See, On the Plurality of Worlds, p. 78.  
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1.3 Research question  
The leading question asked is: 
Given the intelligibility of modal propositions; what is the acquaintance that we need? 
Russell states, “All propositions intelligible to us, whether or not they primarily concern 
things only known to us by description, are composed wholly of constituents with which we are 
acquainted, for a constituent with which we are not acquainted is unintelligible to us”.24 This 
means that if philosophical modal propositions are intelligible to us, then they are composed 
wholly of constituents with which we can be acquainted. However, as we have seen from chapter 
1, the modal nihilists and modal sceptics are troubled because modal knowledge lacks 
acquaintance, thus, modal knowledge, especially the philosophical kind, is unintelligible. Modal 
nihilism was dismissed and modal scepticism was deemed a legitimate objection to philosophical 
modal knowledge. Having realized that modal scepticism should be taken seriously, 
acquaintance as a concept in epistemology needs proper analysis.   
If ever, we are to have acquaintance with modal facts, modal facts have to be real. Here, 
we adopt the Lewisian version of modal realism. Since acquaintance is in essence a justification 
account, it is useful to consider whether or not, Lewis gave any theory of modal justification in 
his modal realism. Chapter 3 begins with the analysis of Lewis’ view on modal epistemology. 
For him, he is more certain of what he knows about metaphysical possibilities than how he 
knows. It is fair to say his argument though compelling does not address the question of how we 
know. I look at some recent accounts of modal epistemology, to ascertain which among them 
offers a sufficient theory of modal justification. Chapter 4 asserts that none of the recent accounts 
achieves this goal. Their inability was due to the lack of a cross-world apparatus, which sustains 
the identity between modal facts and modal thoughts. This cross-world apparatus is then 
explained as ‘threshold’ and with threshold, modal acquaintance succeeds where the recent 
accounts fail.  
1.4 Metaphysical and epistemic assumptions 
This research makes the following assumptions.  
Possible worlds are real. They are independent of our thought about them. These worlds 
exist in logical space and there is a plenitude of them. Building on Stalnaker’s (1988) 
acquiescence when he stated “Lewis is right, I think, that if we reject modal realism, then we 
must give up on the project of providing a reductive analysis of modality”,25 I follow Sider 
(2008) in holding that only LMR produces a respectable reductive account of modality because 
concrete worlds are non-modally defined.26 In the analysis offered in this study, it is assumed 
that LMR presents the correct account of what we know about metaphysical possibilities.  
                                                 
24 ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, p. 125. 
25 R. Stalnaker, ‘Critical Notice of David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds’, 1988, p. 123. 
26 ‘Reducing Modalities’, 2008, p. 1. Sider’s goal in the paper was to produce a reductive analysis of modality, 
which makes no recourse to possible worlds but rather locates modality, somehow, in linguistic convention. 
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In these worlds, there are ‘real particulars’, that is, inhabitants of worlds are themselves 
concrete. These may include sentient beings such as humans and animals, and non-sentient 
beings such as tables, trees, chairs, time, space and so on. These are regarded as ‘objects’, and 
‘things’ is reserved for anything whatever that is not a particular, avoiding where possible the use 
of ‘things’. If there are forces that we are familiar with in the actual world, then these forces too 
are objects. Propositions, numbers, events and facts are likewise objects.  
As explained above, there is a fine demarcating line between de dicto and de re in that 
there might appear a little bit of confusion about what counts as de dicto modality and what 
counts as de re modality. This work takes the position that de dicto modality is ultimately 
reducible to de re modality. Plantinga gives two methods of collapsing de re and de dicto 
modalities into one another. The first way reduces the former into the latter,27 and the second 
way reduces the latter into the former.28 The second way aids the attempt to reduce de dicto 
modality into de re modality in this research. The method here is simple enough: a res (the object 
a de re modal claim, to which we are attributing modality) could also be a proposition.29 This is 
because, in the sense in which ‘object’ is used here, propositions are objects. Let us return to the 
example used earlier in note 11 to illustrate a de dicto modal statement in the demonstration of 
how this reduction works. ◊∃x (Lx & Fx): “possibly, the tree in Jerry’s garden is five feet tall”. 
The res here is the proposition ‘the tree in Jerry’s garden is five feet tall’, and the property 
ascribed to it will be the modal property ‘possible’.30 Thus, even though this is an example of a 
de dicto modal statement, it has been reduced to a de re modal statement, once the proposition 
assumed the role of a res. 
For clarity sake, it is assumed that in talking about knowledge all issues regarding belief 
and justification have been covered. For example, only foundationalism concerning knowledge is 
discussed; the study does not discuss foundationalism concerning belief or justification. Except 
otherwise stated, when I use ‘modal knowledge’, I mean ‘philosophical modal knowledge’. 
When I intend to refer to commonsensical modal knowledge, I would emphatically say so, and 
when I do this, I use ‘philosophical modal knowledge’ instead of ‘modal knowledge’ to visualize 
the contrast between them. 
1.5 Conclusion 
The arguments of the modal nihilists lead to absurdity if we accept them. We cannot afford to 
affirm the non-existence of philosophical modal knowledge because we would then have to 
reject most of what we have come to accept as basic facts about our world, thus, we might not 
take the modal nihilists seriously. However, we cannot ignore the modal sceptics. The modal 
sceptics agree that modality is an important aspect of our everyday reasoning, but denies that 
modality has a place whatsoever in philosophy. Some might ask what we have to lose if we also 
ignore the modal sceptic, but the fact is, we will have much to lose.  
 We have much to lose because commonsensical modal knowledge ultimately leads to 
philosophical modal knowledge so that if we ignore the modal sceptics, we inadvertently, accept 
                                                 
27 Plantinga, ‘De Re et De Dicto’, 1969, pp. 247-258. 
28 Plantinga, ‘Actualism and Possible Worlds’, 1976, p. 148. 
29 See, T. Sider, ‘Reductive Theories of Modality’, p. 184. 
30 This joins perfectly with Sider’s distinction between de dicto and de re modality, which I adopt. See, note 11. 
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we are incapable of having philosophical modal knowledge. The position of van Inwagen that 
only the commonsensical modal knowledge is available might seem a reasonable place to stop, 
but we are not safe with van Inwagen’s position. Commonsensical modal knowledge as used by 
van Inwagen is the knowledge gained from modal statements which are simple and obvious, 
whose truth we are in a position to know. Nevertheless, when van Inwagen asks himself how we 
know the truth of these simple and obvious modal statements, he answers, “I do not know how to 
answer these questions”.31 
 There no explanation (as van Inwagen himself admits) that is sufficient for how we know 
the truth of modal statements without the possible-worlds semantics. It appears that there will 
always be a return to the possible-worlds framework if we are to explain even our 
commonsensical modal knowledge. If this is the case, then commonsensical modal knowledge 
entails philosophical modal knowledge. Bealer (2004) states this entailment thesis differently 
when presenting how he uses ‘could’ in his theory of how we can err in our modal belief. 
According to him, Kripke already gives a satisfactory content of ‘could’ and his account 
preserves that content. This Kripkean content of ‘could’ is that when we use ‘could’ with any 
fact p, we mean p is epistemically possible, and p is epistemically possible if and only if, some 
p* is metaphysically possible, where p* is a counterpart p. Bealer draws from this Kripkean 
content of ‘could’ that the epistemic possibility that p entails the metaphysical possibility that 
some counterpart of p is true.32  
 Bealer encapsulates the reason we are not in a more advantageous position with van 
Inwagen’s position. If we become comfortable with the idea that only commonsensical modal 
knowledge is available and reject philosophical modal knowledge, it is tantamount to removing 
the ground upon which we are standing. That is, since there is no commonsensical modal 
knowledge if there is no philosophical modal knowledge, rejecting philosophical modal 
knowledge translates into rejecting commonsensical modal knowledge. Ultimately, this kind of 
position renders all of us modal nihilists and as shown, modal nihilism is absurd. Consequently, 
pace van Inwagen, we have philosophical modal knowledge and we depend on philosophical 
modal knowledge for our commonsensical modal knowledge.  
                                                 
31 Van Inwagen, ‘Modal Epistemology’, pp. 73-74. 





Knowledge and acquaintance 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Mary the scientist, is released for the first time from her black-and-white room after many years 
of education through black-and-white books and black-and-white television with which she 
acquired all physical facts about the world. Upon stepping outside, she encounters a red tomato 
growing outside her room and she exclaims “Oh my goodness! This is beautiful. It is not black or 
white; what is it?” But why did Mary exclaim if she already had all physical facts about the 
world through her black-and-white books and television? She should just say “Oh well, I know 
this colour, it is red”, that is, her experience of the redness of red should not add anything to her 
oeuvre of knowledge. Mary exclaimed because she had for the first time an unmediated and 
direct experience of an external object and its properties.1  
In the paper where this thought experiment was formulated, Jackson (1982 and 1986) 
unreservedly uses the verb ‘know’ to describe the status of Mary’s cognition, but that was 
because his concern was not with the epistemological status of the content of Mary’s cognition, 
but with physicalism. For Jackson, Mary knows all there is to know about the physical facts of 
the world but she nonetheless learns something new upon her release.2 To the contrary, Russell 
(1910) and many acquaintance theorists, would say Mary does not know anything at all for that 
matter; that she began to know something when she came in direct awareness of external objects. 
According to these acquaintance theorists, we have knowledge only by having acquaintance 
with objects, where acquaintance is the relation we have with objects that we cannot analyse into 
any less problematic concepts.3 The strength of the acquaintance theorists’ position is that it 
appeals to foundationalism in knowledge justification.  
Foundationalism is of the view that if there is justified belief then the evidential chain of 
each justified belief terminates in a justified basic belief. For the acquaintance theorists, the 
direct awareness, which Mary had with the tomato, is a justified non-inferential basic belief. The 
plausibility of foundationalism makes acquaintance an important concept in any epistemology. 
Thus, this chapter critically examines the nature of acquaintance and the role it plays in 
knowledge formation. In section 2.3, following Russell, I argue that acquaintance is fundamental 
                                                 
1 The above statements of Mary are not part of Jackson’s paper. They are included here to show the importance of 
acquaintance as the unmediated and direct experience of an object. In fact, Jackson’s claim was that Mary knows 
what and how red looks like, which is directly opposed to the above statements. 
2 Jackson’s concern was that physicalism is not a complete thesis because it leaves out qualia. Qualia are things like 
the hurtfulness of a pain, the itchiness of itches, pangs of jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a 
lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky. See, F. Jackson, ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, 1982 and 
‘What Mary didn’t Know’, 1986. 
3 R. Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Scepticism, 1995, p. 76. 
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to all knowledge claims. In section 2.4 the question is raised whether acquaintance ought to 
apply to modal statements couched in the possible-worlds framework. Basing this argument on 
one of the features of acquaintance, which says the object with which we have acquaintance must 
exist, the answer is in the affirmative.  
2.2 What is acquaintance? 
Acquaintance as a concept in epistemology originates from Bertrand Russell. According to him, 
acquaintance is the two-termed relation with which we explain the obvious character of 
experience. Acquaintance is to be in direct awareness, to be without the intermediary of any 
process of inference, to stand in a direct cognitive relation with the object.4 We revisit the case of 
John and the longifolia in Jerry’s garden to illustrate this. In the presence of the longifolia, John 
is acquainted with the sense-data that makes up the appearance of the longifolia, namely its 
colour, shape, hardness, height, and so forth. John is acquainted with all the data he is 
immediately conscious of when he sees and stands before the longifolia. Thus, the sense-data, 
which make up the appearance of the longifolia, are things with which John has acquaintance.  
Acquaintance as a cognitive relation is not the sort of relation that constitutes judgment, 
but the sort that constitutes presentation. John is not making any judgment about the longifolia 
through his acquaintance with the sense-data that make up the longifolia’s appearance; rather, the 
sense-data that make up the appearance of the longifolia simply present themselves to John. 
Consequently, acquaintance in the Russellian sense is primitive and has sense-data as its object. 
Furthermore, Russell states that we can be acquainted with universals in the same manner we are 
acquainted with particulars. This for him explains why ‘sense-data’ are respectable ‘objects’ of 
acquaintance. He maintains that; “it is possible, without absurdity, to doubt whet there is a table 
at all, whereas it is not possible to doubt the sense-data” we get from the table.5 In another 
instance, he states, “we have acquaintance with sense-data, with many universals … but not with 
physical objects or other minds”.6 
 Acquaintance is non-judgmental and non-propositional,7 that is, to be acquainted with 
something is to be aware of it in a way that does not essentially involve being aware that it is so-
and-so.8 According to Russell, to be aware that the object is so-and-so is rather to be referred to 
as knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by acquaintance occurs when the subject has an 
immediate or unmediated awareness of some propositional truth based on being in direct 
acquaintance with the object. John is directly acquainted with the longifolia in Jerry’s garden 
through the sense-data of his experience of the longifolia, but he knows by direct acquaintance 
                                                 
4 See, ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, 1910, p. 108; The Problems of Philosophy, 
1912, p. 72; ‘On the Nature of Acquaintance. III. Analysis of Experience’, 1914, p. 453. 
5 Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 72. Italics are mine. 
6 ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, p. 115.  
7 W. Sellars (1956) in what is now known as the Sellarsian dilemma, challenged the existence of a justified basic 
belief, which the acquaintance theorists posit to be realized in acquaintance. T. Poston (2007, p. 343) presents a 
summary of the Sellarsian dilemma; “For assuming basic beliefs are justified by some experience, that experience 
either has propositional content or it does not. If the experience does not have propositional content, then it does not 
justify the belief. But if the experience has propositional content then a further reason is required for thinking that 
the content is accurate or correct.” Davidson (1983), McDowell (1994) and Williams (2005) present sophisticated 
versions of the argument. 
8 A. Hasan, ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance Vs Description’, 2014. 
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(through the sense-data of his experience of the longifolia) that the longifolia is twenty feet tall. 
This distinction, though weak is important.  
If ‘direct awareness’ is essential to acquaintance, then the subject cannot be acquainted 
with something that does not exist. Thus, in a sense, acquaintance guarantees the existence of its 
object. The requirement of existence for the object makes the distinction between acquaintance 
and knowledge by acquaintance more rigid. While we cannot have acquaintance with something 
that does not exist, we can, on the other hand, make judgments and form concepts for things that 
do not exist.9  
Acquaintance does not only explain how knowledge is possible, it also explains how 
thought is possible. According to Russell, whenever we form thoughts, the components of those 
thoughts are items, with which we are acquainted, that is, the identity of a singular thought 
depends on the identity of the object of acquaintance. Russell maintains that every proposition, 
which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are 
acquainted.10 This means that acquaintance restricts our thought content. To illustrate this, 
suppose John just moved into the neighbourhood, and has not been to Jerry’s garden. When Jerry 
visited John at his home to welcome him into the neighbourhood and then complains that the 
longifolia in his garden obstructs the electricity cable, what would John say?  
If John had been acquainted with longifolias in the past, he need not ask how tall this 
particular longifolia is. All he needs to do is make inference and judgment about the specific 
longifolia in Jerry’s garden. But suppose John has never before been acquainted with a 
longifolia; he has never seen one in reality or on television, never read about one, never heard 
about one. What would he say then? He would ask Jerry for a description of this tree, and every 
evidence points to the fact that Jerry’s description would not even satisfy John’s curiosity. John 
would visit Jerry’s garden to get acquainted with the longifolia. Until John does this, he cannot 
have singular thoughts about the longifolia in Jerry’s garden. He would have difficulty in 
convincing anyone that he is having singular thoughts about a longifolia, a tree with which he 
has never been acquainted.  
If acquaintance is not itself judgmental and not propositional, then it does not have 
propositional content. Acquaintance is a form of awareness of something, not awareness that 
something is so-and-so.11 It is neither true nor false that the longifolia in Jerry’s garden presents 
itself to the sensory receptors of John: this is acquaintance. It is, however, true or false that the 
longifolia which John is now acquainted with is twenty feet tall or its leaves are green or that it 
bends in the wind: this is knowledge by acquaintance. Stated differently, while acquaintance 
does not have propositional contents, knowledge by acquaintance does. There is nothing between 
John and his experience of the longifolia; his acquaintance with the longifolia is not composed of 
further relations. Acquaintance is a simple and unanalysable relation. 
The reliability of John’s beliefs also does not affect his acquaintance with the longifolia in 
Jerry’s garden. Whether or not he has some beliefs, which may strengthen or reject his 
experience of the longifolia has nothing to do with his acquaintance with the longifolia. For 
example, if John reliably believes that his senses deceive him more often than not, and because 
                                                 
9 Hasan, ibid. 
10 The Problems of Philosophy, p. 94. 
11 Hasan, 2014. 
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of this belief, he is sceptical about what he perceives; his acquaintance with the longifolia is not 
affected by the fact. These reliable beliefs may, however, help John in deciding whether the data 
he receives from his acquaintance with the longifolia are true or false, that is, whether the data 
correspond with his beliefs. If the data correspond with his beliefs, then they are true, and if they 
do not, then they are false. Reliability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
acquaintance because acquaintance is not by itself an epistemic relation.12 Therefore, 
acquaintance is a form of awareness of the most direct and most secure kind that is fundamental 
to our cognitive capabilities because it appears to be a straightforward way to justifying our 
beliefs. 
2.3 Is acquaintance fundamental to knowledge? 
To stop infinite regress in epistemic justification, foundationalism is the best option. According 
to foundationalism, we have some non-inferential knowledge, and any inferential knowledge we 
have, depends ultimately on this non-inferential knowledge. Thus, let us say that subject s has 
inferential knowledge that p when s knowledge that p depends on s knowledge of some other 
proposition(s) from which s can legitimately infer p, and s has non-inferential knowledge that p 
when s knowledge that p does not depend on any other knowledge s has in this way.13 Many 
epistemologists argue that it is better to think that we have this sort of non-inferential knowledge 
upon which all our knowledge is inferred and which is not itself inferred from any other 
knowledge. To say otherwise that we do not have this sort of non-inferential knowledge upon 
which all our knowledge is inferred, is to say that there is an infinite regress in epistemic 
justification.14 Perhaps, the intuitive absurdity, which this claim implies, is why many 
epistemologists favour foundationalism. 
 One way, probably the most widely used and plausible way to pinpoint this sort of non-
inferential knowledge is to point to acquaintance. Hasan (2014) states, “knowledge by 
acquaintance is foundational knowledge because it depends on one’s acquaintance with the 
object itself, or with properties of or facts about the object, and not on any further knowledge of 
truths”.15 However, knowledge by acquaintance is not the only way we could have knowledge of 
things. If we can only know things through knowledge by acquaintance, our knowledge would be 
more restricted than it is. We also acquire knowledge of physical objects through knowledge by 
description.  
According to Russell, knowledge by description is the knowledge we have of physical 
objects when we are not directly aware of them. Here, reference is made to the hypothetical 
situation of John not having being to Jerry’s garden and yet is able to make judgment about the 
longifolia in Jerry’s garden because he has been acquainted with longifolias in the past. That was 
                                                 
12 Poston, 2007, p. 342 and Fumerton, 1995, p. 77. 
13 Hasan, ibid. 
14 I take it that coherentism, which is standardly situated in between foundationalism and infinitism, is simply a 
gloss over foundationalism, and as such, a form of foundationalism. Coherentism claims that every evidential chain 
of knowledge justification terminates in a coherent set of beliefs. But this begs the question in that how can this 
coherent set of be the terminus of justified knowledge if they are not (taken together as a whole or individually) 
basic non-inferential and justified beliefs. If this is correct, then the coherent set of beliefs is simply the foundation 




a case of knowledge by description. John knows a description and he knows the object, which 
the description applies to, even though he is not directly aware of the object at the time. The 
seemingly obvious difference that sets knowledge by acquaintance apart from knowledge by 
description is that in the former, acquaintance is active and in the latter, it is passive. The subject 
is directly aware of the object in knowledge by acquaintance, whereas the subject is not directly 
aware of the object in knowledge by description. But where does the description the subject 
knows come from? For instance, when someone mentions Pegasus, we can have singular 
thoughts about it even though we have never been directly aware of such a creature, even though 
the description of Pegasus we know does not depend on anyone’s direct awareness of Pegasus 
ever in history. We pick this up in section 2.4.   
According to Russell, knowledge of things is not the only kind of the knowledge we 
have. Beside knowledge of things, we also have knowledge of truth. Knowledge of truth, 
according to Russell, is the knowledge generated through the correspondence between our 
beliefs and facts about those beliefs. Unlike knowledge of things, knowledge of truth could be 
erroneous. In knowledge of things, it is either we know so-and-so through our acquaintance with 
a certain object, or we do not; there is no room for error. In knowledge of truths however, since 
we could hold some erroneous beliefs, which in our minds would have the same vigour as when 
those beliefs were not erroneous; knowledge of truth is knowledge that is opposed to error. Thus, 
rather than knowing that something is so-and-so as with knowledge of things, we know that 
something is the case with knowledge of truth. 
In this way, knowledge of truth plays the role of benefactor by supplying the evidence 
needed in order to accept an incoming belief as knowledge. The curious thing is that while this 
role is clear with regard to the knowledge acquired by description, it is not so clear with 
knowledge acquired by acquaintance. Emphasizing this point, Russell explains;  
Knowledge of things, when it is of the kind we call knowledge by acquaintance, 
is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically independent of 
knowledge of truths, though it would be rash to assume that human beings ever, 
in fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing some 
truth about them. Knowledge of things by description, on the contrary, always 
involves … some knowledge of truths as its source and ground.16 
The inability of Russell to separate knowledge of truth from knowledge by acquaintance 
completely is because knowledge of truth also depends on acquaintance. It seems farfetched to 
suppose that if Mary had no television, that she only had books with no pictures; that she would 
be able to conceive of objects in the same manner as we do. Maybe she will have an idea of what 
physical objects look like, but her conception of these objects may not be the kind we have, 
because we, unlike her, are acquainted with these objects. Knowledge of truth therefore depends 
on acquaintance. In Russell’s words, “all our knowledge, both knowledge of things and 
knowledge of truth, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation”.17  
 
 
                                                 
16 Ibid, pp. 72-73. 
17 Ibid, p. 75. 
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As a form of concluding remark for this section, we could say that it is not only the case 
that acquaintance (i) explains how knowledge is possible and restrict what we know, and (ii) 
explains how thought is possible and restrict what we can think of, it is also (iii) fundamental to 
almost all we know, (iv) sufficient in the formation of knowledge, because (v) it plays an 
important role in epistemic justification, so that (vi) in it, we have a straightforward way to 
justification for knowledge.  
2.4 Acquaintance and possible worlds 
Acquaintance is a sufficient and not necessary condition for the formation of our knowledge of 
objects. Earlier in section 2.3, Pegasus was used to explain how it could become problematic for 
us to have knowledge by description when no one has ever been acquainted with the object. But 
we have singular thoughts about Pegasus despite the lack of acquaintance with it ever in history 
(disregard the toy versions). Let us see where the description of Pegasus originates.  
The description we know of Pegasus originates from our conventional acceptance of a 
certain kind of non-physical object, created in the imagination of a poet, such that the inferred 
meaning when anyone uses ‘Pegasus’ is the content of the poet’s imagination. The fictional 
animal according to the anonymous poet in familiar terms would be a white-winged horse. In this 
way, no one can say by ‘Pegasus’ he or she means something else other than a white-winged 
horse. Thus, even though we are not acquainted with Pegasus because it does not exist, we can 
know about it through knowledge by description, provided we already have a description. Given 
the flowchart of acquaintance in section 2.3, knowledge by description also depends on 
acquaintance, thus, how acquaintance helps in the formation of our knowledge by description of 
Pegasus needs explanation.  
In chapter 1, we saw that the domain of existing objects transcends the world in which we 
inhabit. We saw that objects in possible worlds also exists, albeit non-actually. Under that notion, 
we may say Pegasus does not exist in our world, but it does exist in a possible world. 
Consequently, since existence is a criterion for acquaintance, and there are non-actually existing 
objects like Pegasus, then the domain of objects with which we can be acquainted, includes both 
the actually existing and the non-actually existing objects. In this way, interpreting Russell in a 
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manner that suggests, “we are unable to have acquaintance with Pegasus because Pegasus does 
not exist” is mistaken. Russell was not as equipped as we are today with modality and the 
possible-worlds semantics, thus, any interpretation, which excludes non-actually existing objects 
from the domain of acquaintance, fails to keep up with the progress in philosophical theorization. 
With modality and possible-world semantics at our disposal, we are enabled to reframe such 
interpretation: “we are able to have acquaintance with Pegasus because Pegasus exists, albeit in a 
possible world which is not actual”. Thus, joining the flowchart as another kind of knowledge 
that depends on acquaintance is our modal knowledge. 
 Acquaintance with modal objects requires clearer explanation. According to LMR, the 
causal isolation of possible worlds from the actual world blocks acquaintance in the Russellian 
sense with non-actually existing objects. This is so because the Russellian sense of acquaintance 
requires the object’s ability to produce sense-data, and modal objects do not produce any sense-
data. Russell himself allows the extension of the object of acquaintance beyond sense-data. He 
states; “Sense-data, as we have already seen, are among the things with which we are acquainted; 
in fact, they supply the most obvious and striking example of knowledge by acquaintance. But if 
they were the sole example, our knowledge would be very much more restricted than it is”.18 To 
be exact, Russell himself considers other examples of objects of acquaintance, namely, memory, 
introspection and self-consciousness.19 It is not surprising then that contemporary acquaintance 
theorists are not so interested in sense-data as the object of acquaintance as they focus on some 
other entities that are internal to the subject, such as properties, facts, relations, sensation, 
thoughts, truth-makers, and so on. Since the Russellian account of acquaintance is well known 
for its preference of sense-data as object of acquaintance, I will henceforth distinguish it from the 
contemporary theories accounts.  
2.4.1 The contemporary senses of acquaintance  
Few definitions of acquaintance by these contemporary theorists will put matters in perspective. 
 Fumerton (1995): Acquaintance is not another intentional state to be construed as a non-
relational property of the mind. Acquaintance is a sui generis relation that holds between a 
self and a thing, property, or a fact.20 
 Fumerton (1995): […] one is acquainted with the fact that P, the thought that P, and the 
relation of correspondence holding between the thought that P and the fact that P.21 
 Bonjour (2001): acquaintance is a ‘built-in’ feature that is intrinsic to conscious or 
experiential states, so that it is not a relation between the self and something else, but is an 
intrinsic feature of the mental state itself.22 
 Hasan (2014): acquaintance is simple and unanalysable. We can point to acquaintance by 
describing it in some revealing way that is unique to it, for example, the relation a subject has 
with the sensation of pain.23 
                                                 
18 The Problem of Philosophy, p. 75. 
19 Ibid, pp. 75-76. 
20 Metaepistemology and Scepticism, p. 74. Italics are mine. 
21 Ibid, p. 75. Italics are mine. 
22 ‘Towards a Defence of Empirical Foundationalism’, p. 31. Italics are mine. 
23 ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance Vs Description’. Italics are mine. 
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From these definitions, we see that Russell’s suggestion that “we have therefore to 
consider acquaintance with other things besides sense-data if we are to obtain any tolerably 
adequate analysis of our knowledge” has been harkened to. Such entities that are internal to the 
subject as facts, properties, thoughts, truth-makers, sensation, and relations have received 
sufficient theorizations on how they, like sense-data, could be objects of acquaintance. Since the 
goal here is to explain how we are acquainted with modal facts, we need to establish which 
among these internal entities most closely identifies modal facts. On the above list of internal 
entities, ‘thoughts’ seem to be the closest identifier of modal facts. S* is the closest identifier of S 
if and only if in domain D, S needs to be explained but S is absent and no other entity in D is 
closer to S than S*. One major reason for this is trivially that all we have to show for modal facts 
are thoughts about them and more importantly, the nature of thoughts does not conflict with the 
nature of modal facts when we say thoughts most closely identify modal facts. Besides 
‘thoughts’ in the listed internal entities, only ‘properties’ rival ‘thoughts’ as the closest identifier 
of modal facts. Arguably, sensations, truth-makers and relations less closely identify modal facts 
than properties and thoughts. However, unlike thoughts, the nature of properties conflicts with 
that of modal facts when we refer to properties as the closest identifier of modal thoughts. 
The ‘closest identifier’ argument is aimed at locating which among those entities that are 
internal to the subject can be said to be the subject’s evidence that he has modal beliefs. 
Properties can be characterized both as predicables and as exemplifiables. As predicables, 
properties are those entities that can be attributed (or predicated) of things, for example, if we say 
that the thing on the table is red and is an apple, we attribute the properties ‘red’ and ‘apple’ to it. 
As exemplifiables, properties are entities, which things are said to bear or possess. If the 
attribution of ‘red’ and ‘apple’ to the thing on the table is true (or more appropriately, veridical), 
then the thing in question exemplifies the properties of ‘red’ and ‘apple’. Properties appear in 
their capacity as predicables on the above list of internal entities. In their capacity as 
exemplifiables, properties do not count as internal entities because they have to be mind-
independent before they could be exemplified.24 Now, according to the modal realists, modal 
facts are mind-independent. As such, to isolate properties as the closest identifier of modal facts 
will be correct just in case we mean properties, in their capacity as exemplifiables. However, 
‘closest identifier’ roughly defined above is non-compossible with properties, in their capacity as 
exemplifiables; it is only compossible with properties, in their capacity as predicables. Thus, 
when we isolate properties as the closest identifier of modal facts, the nature of properties 
conflicts with the nature of modal facts because we would have to isolate properties in their 
capacity as predicables. 
According to Fumerton, thoughts are non-relational properties of a mind, whose presence 
is logically distinct from, though no doubt causally dependent on, brain states. Thoughts may be 
true or false. When they are true, they correspond to facts, and when they are false, they fail to 
correspond. On the other hand, facts are non-linguistic complexes that consist in entities 
exemplifying properties such that worlds contain facts long before they contain minds and 
                                                 
24 Analysis of property here is due to Orilia and Swoyer, ‘Properties’, 2016. 
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thoughts.25 It is important to emphasize that the causal dependence of thoughts on brain states is 
innocuous to the reason thoughts were isolated as the closest identifier of modal objects. No 
doubt, thoughts are formed when brain states interact, hence their causal dependency on brain 
states, but that is not the causal relation or lack thereof, which makes thoughts the closest 
identifier of modal facts. Thoughts are not causally dependent on the facts with which they 
correspond or fail to correspond. It would be preposterous to say the fact, with which a given 
thought corresponds, somehow “directly” caused the thought. I have the thought of writing this 
paper, but the fact that I am writing this paper is not in any way the cause of that thought. I can 
still have the thought of writing this paper even though I am writing a different paper or no paper 
at all. I may well have never written any paper in my life and still have the thought of writing 
this paper, perhaps, after reading it. Thus, facts do not cause the thoughts which correspond to 
them. The correspondence relation holding between thoughts and facts will be extensively 
discussed later in section 4.4.1. 
Since thoughts are objects of acquaintance, and having isolated ‘thought’ as the closest 
identifier of modal objects, it follows that we can have acquaintance with modal thoughts. More 
clearly, when we are directly aware of any given modal thought, and that modal thought 
corresponds to a modal fact, let us henceforth say we are modally acquainted with the modal fact 
with which the given modal thought correspond. Thus, on the one hand, there is the Russellian 
sense, which enforces a stringent notion of acquaintance in sense-data, and on the other hand, 
there is the contemporary sense which enforces a flexible notion of acquaintance in 
accommodating more internal entities than sense-data. On the provisions of the contemporary 
sense, we now have a new kind of acquaintance, namely, modal acquaintance. Henceforth, 
‘acquaintance’ refers to acquaintance without qualification; ‘causal acquaintance’ to the 
Russellian sense; and ‘modal acquaintance’ to our acquaintance with modal objects via our 
thoughts about them. It is important to re-emphasize that acquaintance is primitive, simple and 
unanalysable, ‘causal acquaintance’ as used here to describe and identify the Russellian sense is 
not suggestive of a causal nature for the Russellian sense. Rather, it is in a bid to better explain 
Lewis (in chapter 3), who used causal acquaintance often in his epistemological account for 
modal realism.      
2.4.2 Modal acquaintance  
As argued in the preceding section, modal thoughts are not special kinds of thoughts, they are 
thoughts simpliciter, and as such, they can be objects of acquaintance. In addition, we can now 
say we are modally acquainted with modal facts when we are directly aware of the modal 
thoughts that correspond to them. Modal acquaintance is therefore the non-causal basic 
psychological relation we have with modal facts via modal thoughts. Modal acquaintance fulfils 
the potentials of acquaintance because as we have seen in sections 2.3 and 2.4, acquaintance 
restricts thought content and thought formation. Despite modal acquaintance, acquaintance 
remains only a sufficient and not a necessary condition for knowledge and thought formation. 
This is because modal acquaintance only accounts for modal knowledge and modal knowledge is 
only one among the kinds of knowledge we have that seems to be acquired without acquaintance. 
We do not also require acquaintance to have mathematical knowledge and moral knowledge.  
                                                 
25 Fumerton, 1995, p. 73. 
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If acquaintance is as BonJour suggests, a built-in feature that is intrinsic to conscious or 
experiential states, then modal acquaintance is not just an internalist account, but a mentalist 
account. Generally, internalism is the view that epistemic properties, precisely justification, are 
internal characteristics of the subject and that the subject needs to be aware of these epistemic 
properties. Mentalism rejects the latter clause by stating that the subject does not need to be 
aware of epistemic properties. Pollock gives a more systematic definition of mentalism. 
According to him, a belief’s justification is a function of those states of the believer that are 
accessible to her automatic processors, whether or not those states are epistemically accessible 
(or potentially epistemically accessible) to the believer.26 Likewise, we are not required or 
expected to be aware in a higher-order state, of the cognitive mechanism that directs our 
cognition of modal thoughts. We are not required and not expected to be aware that we are 
modally acquainted with modal facts before we can have modal knowledge. Whether we are 
aware of it or not, modal acquaintance keeps on doing its job. This explains why we often take 
for granted that we might be incapable of having modal knowledge and why everyone 
effortlessly employs modality in both ordinary and systematic reasoning. 
2.5 Conclusion  
Lowe has an interesting view, that is relevant here. Lowe’s view sets the stage for the sui generis 
classification of modal knowledge. According to him, “all metaphysics is implicitly modal [and] 
metaphysical modality is grounded in essence”.27 For him, “metaphysics is primarily concerned 
with a priori arguments for the possibility of certain ontological categories and hypotheses; and 
also, on partly empirical grounds, providing arguments for the actuality of some of those 
possibilities”.28 If as Lowe argues “the relevant epistemic process is not based on intuitions or 
thought experiments, but rather on direct a priori access to essentialist facts which ground modal 
truths”,29 then ‘essence precedes existence’. Stated differently, the essence of modal objects 
precedes their existence since the relevant epistemic process is based on a priori access to facts 
about these essences. Thus, modal objects are out there and realism about modality is a 
defensible project.  
This position presupposes that there is modal knowledge and that we are capable of having 
such knowledge. However, given the important role of Russell’s schemata for knowledge 
classification in knowledge and thought formation, how to classify modal knowledge based on 
the classification requires attention. Modal knowledge is not knowledge of truth because it is 
such that no theory of truth available (correspondence, coherence and deflationary) would 
satisfactorily explain if modal knowledge is erroneous or not. Modal knowledge is also not 
knowledge of things because it is such that there is no casual acquaintance with modal objects. 
This means that on the flowchart, which explains the fundamentality of acquaintance to 
knowledge and thought formation, modal knowledge cannot be subsumed under knowledge of 
                                                 
26 See, Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 1986, pp. 133-134. 
27 E. J. Lowe, ‘The Rationality of Metaphysics’, 2011, p. 106.  




truth or knowledge of things. It follows that modal knowledge is of a sui generis kind, differing 
from knowledge of truth and knowledge of things.  
Given that Russell’s schemata for knowledge classification inadvertently makes 
acquaintance fundamental to knowledge formation, we need to explain how we acquire modal 
knowledge through acquaintance? With the aid of the contemporary sense of acquaintance, we 
were able to construct a new notion of acquaintance, as modal acquaintance. Modal acquaintance 
enabled the explanation of how acquaintance applies to the formation of modal knowledge. 
Granted that we can now explain how we have modal knowledge through acquaintance, how do 
we have acquaintance with modal facts, which are isolated in possible worlds? Before providing 
an answer to that, it is useful to undertake a survey of the accounts of modal epistemology 
available. This is so because we need to ascertain where and how they failed to provide an 





The ‘How We Know’ question 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Just like mathematical knowledge, we like to think we have modal knowledge (see arguments 
against modal nihilism and modal scepticism in section 1.2). Also, like mathematical knowledge, 
modal knowledge eludes all attempts for an adequate epistemology, probably because it does not 
fit into the theories of knowledge we have (see the argument for its sui generis classification in 
section 2.5). In a recent publication edited by A. Kind and P. Kung, Ichikawa states; 
There is a substantial contemporary literature engaging with questions 
about the epistemology of metaphysical modality … Modal 
epistemology concerns our epistemic access to facts about modality. In 
particular, modal epistemology typically concerns itself with questions 
about our knowledge (or justified beliefs, etc.) of claims about 
metaphysical possibility and metaphysical necessity. One obvious 
question about our epistemic access to facts about metaphysical 
possibility and necessity is this one: 
(How) How do we come to know facts about metaphysical possibility 
and necessity? 
The How question is familiar in the relevant literature, as are various 
responses to it. According to one familiar response, we come to know 
propositions to be possible by conceiving of them, or by conceiving of 
them in a certain privileged sort of way [e.g. Yablo (1993). Cf. Chalmers 
(2002)]. According to another familiar response, we use a faculty of 
rational intuition to come to know truths of modality [e.g. Bealer (2002), 
Sosa (2007, ch 3)]. A different sort of response rejects the presupposition 
of the question, suggesting that the apparent ubiquity of knowledge of 
metaphysical modality is an illusion brought on by hubristic 
overconfidence [e.g., in a limited version, van Inwagen (1998). See also 
the view discussed in O’Leary-Hawthorne (1996, p. 185)].1 
The directness of Ichikawa already makes clear what this chapter is all about: the 
explication of modal epistemology, the question of ‘How We Know’ and responses to the 
question. Many who have read Kripke (1980) claim that the putative knowledge of many 
metaphysical necessities suddenly became accessible after reading him. For instance, such 
claims include, “we now know that gold is necessarily the element with the atomic number 79”, 
                                                 
1 J. J. Ichikawa, ‘Modals and Modal Epistemology’, 2016, pp. 124-125. Italics are footnotes in the original text. 
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or that “water is necessarily H2O”. The possibility versions of such claims also abound. They 
include, “we now know that is possible for the meter stick in Paris to be longer than one meter” 
or that “Obama could have been the 46th President of the United States of America”. This sort of 
Kripkean access to philosophical modal knowledge only takes us as far as realizing the force of 
metaphysical necessities and possibilities; it does not explain how we come to know them. The 
explanation of how we come to know metaphysical necessities and possibilities is the concern of 
modal epistemology.2 Ichikawa notes many responses to the ‘How We Know’ question. In this 
chapter, some of the responses he mentions are discussed. Discussing these responses begins 
from Lewis’ own response in section 3.2.  
3.2 Lewis’ response to the ‘How We Know’ question3 
Lewis began by drawing a close similarity between mathematical knowledge and modal 
knowledge. Mathematical knowledge, according to him is the kind of knowledge we have that 
defies the theories of knowledge at our disposal. In his view, we can adopt this line of reasoning 
when considering modal knowledge. Thus, for him, our acquiescence when considering the 
epistemology of mathematics is enough primacy (precedence for Lewis) when considering the 
epistemology of modal knowledge. Lewis built this primacy of mathematical knowledge for 
modal knowledge on the dilemma put forward by Benacerraf.  
Benacerraf (1973) presents the problem in this way. Firstly, by explaining in a neo-
platonistic way that there are abstract, non-mental and non-physical objects such as numbers and 
sets. Secondly, that any reasonable epistemological theory of knowledge is causal. The 
conclusions of these two premises yield the famous Benacerraf’s dilemma: what is necessary for 
mathematical truth makes mathematical knowledge impossible;  
For, as I will suggest, accounts of truth that treat mathematical and 
nonmathematical discourse in relevantly similar ways do so at the cost of 
leaving it unintelligible how we can have any mathematical knowledge 
whatsoever; whereas those which attribute to mathematical propositions 
the kinds of truth conditions we can clearly know to obtain, do so at the 
expense of failing to connect these conditions with any analysis of the 
sentences which shows how the assigned conditions are conditions of 
their truth.4 
 The dilemma can be further explained in this way:  
(1) Accounts of truth that treat mathematical and nonmathematical discourse in relevantly 
similar ways do so at the cost of leaving it unintelligible how we can have mathematical 
knowledge. The only way to give an epistemological account of mathematical knowledge is to 
                                                 
2 Bealer presents two more definitions of ‘modal epistemology’. He states; “The term ‘modal epistemology’ may be 
understood in three ways. First, as the theory of modal knowledge – knowledge of what is necessary and possible. 
Second, as the theory of possible knowledge – what sorts of knowledge are possible. Third, as the intersection of the 
first two: the theory of possible modal knowledge – that is, of what modal knowledge is possible”. The classification 
of modal epistemology above corresponds to Bealer’s first way. See, ‘Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist 
Renaissance’, 2002, p. 71. 
3 This section explains section 2.4: ‘How Can We Know?’ of Lewis’ On the Plurality of Worlds, pp. 108-115.  
4 P. Benacerraf, ‘Mathematical Truth’, 1973, p. 662. 
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attempt to produce a semantics which would explain mathematics in the same manner as it 
explains other aspects of our language. However, if we do this, we lose our hold on mathematical 
knowledge.  
(2) Accounts of truth which attribute to mathematical propositions the kinds of truth conditions 
we can clearly know to obtain, do so at the expense of failing to connect these conditions with 
any analysis of the sentences which shows how the assigned conditions are conditions of their 
truth. The best account of knowledge (and truth) available requires truth to refer to objects, and 
since mathematical objects are abstract entities, we cannot make reference to any mathematical 
object. Thus, we cannot ascribe truth-condition and truth-value to mathematical statements. 
However, if mathematical statement cannot be assigned truth-values, then there can be no 
mathematical knowledge.  
 Lewis continues from here. For him, despite the dilemma, it would be too radical a 
change if we decide to serve epistemology by giving mathematics some devious semantics. In 
his view, any such attempt is hubristic and ridiculous especially when “our knowledge of 
mathematics is ever so much more secure than our knowledge of the epistemology that seeks to 
cast doubt on mathematics”.5 Consequently, Lewis opines that even though we do not have a 
sufficient epistemic account of mathematics, there is no uncertainty about mathematical 
knowledge. Lewis believes that the epistemology of mathematics leads the way in any attempt to 
answer the ‘How We Know’ question of modal knowledge. The epistemology of mathematics 
leads the way for the epistemology of modality because just as in Benacerraf’s dilemma, what 
seems necessary for modal truth seems to make modal knowledge impossible.  
 However, using the epistemology of mathematics in this way involves some risks. (1) 
Future philosophy of mathematics might turn out to be able to interpret mathematics in an 
ontologically innocent way without commitment to any unobservable mathematical objects. (2) 
Future philosophy of mathematics might be accompanied by a future epistemology of 
mathematics, which would guarantee this interpretation without any devious semantics. (3) The 
similarity between mathematical knowledge and modal knowledge is a contingent similarity.6 
 Lewis maintains that the first and the second risks are defeasible and as such are 
dismissible in the same manner and frequency with which they are objections to his primacy 
thesis. Even if the realization of both the first and the second risks, which in his view is 
dubitable, is granted, such realization does not altogether wreck the primacy thesis. This is 
plausible because we would still have been able to understand mathematics in the manner that 
we do; the realization of this innocent way of interpreting mathematics does nothing to what and 
how we conceive mathematics.  
 Lewis provides two responses to the third risk. The first response is that we have 
abundant modal knowledge of the existence of concrete actual individuals not causally related to 
us in any way.7 If this is correct and we have this abundant modal knowledge perhaps via a 
priori means, divorcing modality from mathematics seems unprincipled. This is how. 
Mathematical objects are abstract while modal objects are concrete. We may say we cannot have 
causal acquaintance with mathematical objects because of their abstract nature, but Lewis argues 
                                                 
5 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, p. 109. 
6 Ibid, pp. 109-110. 
7 Ibid, p. 110. 
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that this is ludicrous. He thinks it is laughable to say we know only abstract entities without 
causal acquaintance because they are simply abstract. If we know abstract entities without causal 
acquaintance, then our access to them must not be because of their non-concrete nature. He 
explains his reasons in the second response. Lewis continues that knowledge is demarcated by 
contingency and not by concreteness. That is, what we know are the contingent data we get 
through our senses, and not what are concrete. These contingent data set up patterns of 
counterfactual dependence such that had the data been different, what we know would also be 
different. However, numbers are not contingent; therefore, nothing can depend counterfactually 
on what mathematical objects there are. Thus, mathematical knowledge differs from other kinds 
of knowledge we have because it is a non-contingent kind of knowledge. 
 Lewis ties the primacy thesis to the non-contingency of mathematics which modality has 
in common with mathematics. According to him, modal knowledge is like mathematical 
knowledge because both are non-contingent. Just as nothing could counterfactually depend on 
non-contingents such as numbers, so also nothing could counterfactually depend on a 
metaphysical possibility. Nothing serious can be said about how our opinions would be different 
if there were no possibility for dragons and Pegasus to co-exist in a single world or if there were 
no counterpart-longifolia in any possible world. Thus, in his view, there is a close similarity 
between modality and mathematics such that whatever we do or say when we consider the 
epistemology of the latter is what we should do or say when we consider the epistemology of the 
former. With his primacy thesis secured, Lewis divides the knowledge we can have into two; (1) 
knowledge of modal objects and mathematical objects, which we do not obtain through 
observation, and (2) knowledge of actual objects, which we obtain through observation. 
Nevertheless, this knowledge-division has not provided an answer to the ‘How We Know’ 
question. Lewis gives three ways to understand the ‘How We Know’ question. 
 Firstly, we take the question as a request for a fully general analysis of knowledge. Such 
analysis would apply to all our knowledge claims, modal and mathematical knowledge included. 
In Lewis’ view, this is not particularly his problem because it is a problem for everyone. More 
so, the modal realist’s construal of modal knowledge does not worsen the status of our theories 
of knowledge.8 Secondly, the question of ‘How We Know’ can be a request for a ‘naturalistic 
epistemology’. According to him, the principle of recombination accounts for a naturalistic 
epistemology of how we come to have modal knowledge. “We try to think how duplicates of 
things already accepted as possible – for instance because they are actual – might be arranged to 
fit the description of an alleged possibility. Having imagined various arrangements -not in 
complete detail, of course - we consider how they might aptly be described”.9 However, the 
principle of recombination breaks down when we consider more far-fetched possibilities because 
such possibilities may be too complex to be imagined. Thirdly, we take the ‘How We Know’ 
question as a sceptical challenge. By sceptical challenge, Lewis means a request to put our 
alleged modal knowledge on a firm foundation or a request to show that we derive our modal 
knowledge by an infallible method. In his view, this request for a regress argument of 
                                                 
8 Ibid, p. 113.  
9 Ibid, p. 114.  
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justification for our modal knowledge, and for an infallible method is simply a hopeless 
venture.10  
 Conclusively, in the view of Lewis, (i) we have modal knowledge and modal realism is 
the correct account of what we know about metaphysical possibilities, (ii) modal knowledge, like 
mathematical knowledge, seems not to fit into the theories of truth and knowledge we have. (iii) 
Any attempt to fit modal knowledge into the available theories of truth and knowledge seems to 
renders modal knowledge impossible, (iv) any epistemology of modal knowledge to be proffered 
must explain our access to modal facts in clear language. (v) That (iv) seems largely unrealistic 
does not mean we eschew modality and modal knowledge. Thus, whether or not we can ascertain 
the truth of LMR, modality remains respectable because we are far more confident of what we 
know about metaphysical possibilities than how we know. After all, no one jettisons 
mathematics even though we do not have an epistemology for mathematical truths. 
3.3 Recent responses to the ‘How We Know’ question 
Attempts to answer the ‘How We Know’ question surfaced in the literature of modal 
metaphysics and modal epistemology. As seen in section 3.1, Ichikawa points us in the right 
direction. He mentioned Yablo (1993), Bealer (2002), Chalmers (2002), and others. The likes of 
Hill (2006), and Williamson (2007) are added to the list.  
3.3.1 The conceivability theorists 
These are philosophers who think that we have epistemic access to modal facts through our 
imagination or put strictly, through our capacity to conceive. A common theme of these 
philosophers is that “if it is conceivable that p then it is possible that p”. Hard-core 
conceivabilists include Kripke (1980), Nagel (1974), White (1986), Robinson (1993), Jackson 
(1982, 1993, and 1998), Chalmers (1996, 1999 and 2002), Levine (1998), and Yablo (1993). For 
our purpose, which is to understand how conceivability allows us access to modal knowledge, 
only Yablo and Chalmers are discussed. This is because they did not only employ the 
conceivability thesis in their theories, they set out to explain why and how conceivability is a 
guide to possibility. 
3.3.1.1 Yablo’s ‘conceivability via imaginability’ 
Since Descartes’ controversial transition from his ability to conceive himself as a disembodied 
entity to the conclusion that he is not identical with his body via the possibility of his 
disembodied existence, considerable efforts have been devoted to illustrate why conceivability is 
not a guide to possibility. Yablo (1993) maintains that if the problem with conceivability 
methods was only that we could not explain their reliability, then, maybe we could live with that. 
The problem is supposed to be that they are demonstrably unreliable, and this he finds 
unphilosophical, especially when conceivability methods hold much degree of persuasion and 
verisimilitude. Thus, he avers, philosophers who are willing to be persuaded of p’s possibility by 
their ability to conceive p (and that is most of us, most of the time, according to him) should face 
the issue squarely. Hence, he sets out to defend the position that conceivability is a guide to 
possibility. 
                                                 
10 Ibid, pp. 114-115. 
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According to Yablo, conceivability is closely aligned with imagination. According to 
him, imagination can either be propositional; when we imagine that there is a tiger behind the 
curtain, or objectual; when we imagine the tiger itself. Yablo argues that it is propositional 
imagining as accompanied by objectual imagining that is of interest. That is, to imagine ‘that 
there is a tiger behind the curtain’ which is propositional, entails imagining ‘a tiger’, and 
imagining ‘it as behind the curtain’ which is objectual. Since our imagination is incomplete, and 
possible worlds are maximally complete in every respect, not every instance of our imagination 
yields a possible world. Rather, the instances of our imagination are situations, which are parts of 
possible worlds, and they are verifiable by the possible world, which they are part of. Thus, we 
can say “conceiving that p is a way of imagining that p; it is imagining that p by imagining a 
world in which p is held to be a true description. Thus, p is conceivable for me if I can imagine a 
world that I take to verify p”.11  
 Yablo continues that this kind of analysis could lead into two directions. (1) imagining a 
res in this way is impossible unless it already appears that the res could exist, and (2) to imagine 
a res is thereby to enjoy the appearance that the res could exist. In his analysis, (1) is not correct 
because there are counterexamples to it. We were able to admit the possibility of such things as 
justified true beliefs that are not knowledge (of Gettier (1963)) and zombie individuals (of 
Chalmers (2002)) after we learnt to imagine them. (1) is therefore not the correct way in which 
imagination works. Yablo thinks (2) must be correct since (1) is wrong. In addition, the reason 
why (1) is incorrect shows that it is in fact, in the act of imagining the zombie individuals and the 
Gettier counterexample to knowledge as justified true beliefs, that it is conceivable that such 
zombie individuals and justified true beliefs which are not knowledge, are indeed possible. 
Therefore, conceivability as a guide to possibility divides into two sub-tasks: (1) imagining a 
possible world and (2) satisfying ourselves that p is true in the imagined world.  
 For Yablo, we should interpret the conceivability thesis as a fallible evidence for 
possibility. Ignorance of the impossibility of p may lead me into imagining and thus conceiving 
p. Suppose that there is a q such that if q is true, p is impossible, but I was not aware that q is 
true, I could go ahead and conceive p and from conceiving that p, conclude that p is possible. For 
instance, the ancients conceived it as possible for Hesperus to outlast Phosphorus because they 
were ignorant of the truth that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus. According to Yablo, this 
sort of ignorance is not tantamount to the impossibility of p. He therefore concludes that 
whatever a subject s finds conceivable, s is prima facie entitled to regard as metaphysically 
possible, because ignorance of the fact that the whatever s conceived is impossible does not itself 
do much to explain why s could conceive it as possible in the first place.12 
3.3.1.2 Chalmers’ Zombie-conceivability  
Chalmers’ (1996, 1999 and 2002) position on the ‘How We Know’ question is set in a broader 
context of demonstrating the incompleteness of physicalism. If physicalism is true, then no 
possible world w can be identical to our world with respect to physical facts without being 
identical in mental facts. However, if there are zombie worlds, then physicalism is false. Take a 
zombie world as an exact physical duplicate of our world, where there are no conscious 
                                                 
11 S. Yablo, ‘Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?’, 1993, pp. 28-29. 
12 See, Ibid, p. 34 & 36. 
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experiences, and a zombie as a molecule-for-molecule duplicate of a conscious person, which 
lacks conscious experiences. Chalmers argues that there are zombie worlds because a zombie 
world is conceivable by means of ideal rational reflection on the concepts employed in the 
description of a zombie world. By ideal rational reflection, Chalmers means that the description 
of a zombie world does not involve any contradiction.13 In the structure of the argument, the 
weakest link is the movement from conceivability to possibility, and many criticisms of the 
argument against the completeness of physicalism from zombies-conceivability have come from 
that angle.14 Thus, Chalmers (2002) set out to make this link strong by defending the position 
that conceivability is indeed a guide to possibility. 
 According to Chalmers (2002), we need to deconstruct conceivability before we attempt 
to demonstrate how conceivability is a guide to possibility. For him, conceivability is a property 
of a proposition, and the conceivability of a statement is in many cases, relative to a thinker, so 
that when we say S is conceivable what we mean is really that S is conceivable to a subject s. 
Conceivability may be understood in different ways. Chalmers explains three dimensions of 
difference between the notions of conceivability: prima facie vs. ideal conceivability, positive vs. 
negative conceivability, and primary vs. secondary conceivability.15  
 If S is prima facie conceivable, then S is conceivable on first appearance, that is, S passes 
the tests that are criteria for conceivability. The criteria to be passed depend on other substantive 
notions of conceivability, which are yet to be explained. Anticipating one of these notions, say, 
primary conceivability to illustrate this, S is primary conceivable if S is actually the case. Under 
this notion, S is prima facie conceivable if, on first appearance, S is actually the case. Ideal 
conceivability complements or grounds prima facie conceivability in a sense. S is ideally 
conceivable if S is conceivable on ideal rational reflection. Using the notion of primary 
conceivability highlighted above, S is ideally conceivable if, after ideal rational reflection on S, 
we discover that S is always actually the case. Thus, when S fails the criterion for conceivability, 
even though S is prima facie conceivable, S will not be ideally conceivable. When the criteria are 
passed, S is both prima facie and ideally conceivable. 
 S is positively conceivable when positive conception of a situation in which S is the case 
is conceivable. This is very similar to Yablo’s notion of conceivability discussed above so that 
we bring in imagination to explain how this verifying-situation is positively conceived. S is 
negatively conceivable when S is not ruled out (either a priori or via contradiction), that is, no 
situation can be conceived that rules out S.16 Chalmers’ explanation of these notions of 
                                                 
13 See, A. Berglund, ‘From Conceivability to Possibility: An Essay in Modal Epistemology’, 2005, p. 43. 
14 A simplified version of the argument is presented by Aranyosi; 
1. If zombies are logically possible, then zombies are metaphysically possible. 
2. If zombies are metaphysically possible, then physicalism is false. 
3. Zombies are conceivable. 
4. If zombies are conceivable, then zombies are logically possible. 
5. Zombies are logically possible. (from 3 and 4) 
6. Zombies are metaphysically possible. (from 1 and 5) 
7. Physicalism is false. (from 2 and 6) 
In Aranyosi’s simplified version, 4 refers to the weakest link. See, I. Aranyosi, Physicalism and Consciousness. A 
defence of commonsense functionalism, Ph.D. thesis, 2004. 
15 D. Chalmers, ‘Does Conceivability Entail Possibility’, 2002, p. 2. 
16 Chalmers likened the relation between positive and negative conceivability to van Cleve’s (1983) weak and strong 
notions of conceivability. According to van Cleve, S is strongly conceivable when S is possible; and S is weakly 
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conceivability builds on one another so that S is prima facie positively conceivable or prima 
facie negatively conceivable or ideally positively conceivable or ideally negatively conceivable. 
If S is prima facie positively conceivable, then it appears on first appearance that an imaginable 
situation verifies S. If S is prima facie negatively conceivable, then it appears on first appearance 
that S is not totally ruled out a priori and/or is not ruled out by contradiction by any imaginable 
situation. S is ideally positively conceivable if after ideal rational reflection we detect that that an 
imaginable situation verifies S. S is ideally negatively conceivable when ideal rational reflection 
on S grounds that it is not a priori that ¬S or it is not contradictory that S. Chalmers argues that 
if S is positively conceivable, S is negatively conceivable (in both the prima facie and ideal 
cases). 
 S is primarily (or empirically) conceivable when S is actually the case. S is secondarily 
(or subjunctively) conceivable when S might have been the case. Consider a Kripkean example 
for illustration. According to Kripke, Hesperus is Phosphorus is a true sentence. If it is true it is 
necessarily true. Thus, it is actually the case that Hesperus is Phosphorus and this is a case of 
primary conceivability. However, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is a necessary a posteriori truth, 
thus, there was a time when it was thought that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. That is, it might 
have been the case that Hesperus is not Phosphorus and this is a case of secondary 
conceivability. Similar to the case of positive and negative conceivability, the versions of prima 
facie, ideal, positive and negative primary or secondary conceivability are also constructible.   
With these distinctive notions of conceivability explained, Chalmers moves on to identify 
the specific notion of conceivability that is the best guide to possibility. According to him, prima 
facie conceivability, is not a good guide to possibility. As pointed out above, this is because (1) 
prima facie conceivability can easily be undermined by ideal conceivability and (2) when prima 
facie positive conceivability does not back prima facie negative possibility (but, they should 
always back each other up), the possibility that is evoked is a weak one. He also contends that 
ideal conceivability fares better than prima facie conceivability since both ideal positive and 
ideal negative conceivability are more tenable than prima facie positive and prima facie negative 
conceivability, and they back each other up. These leave him with primary and secondary 
conceivability. He concludes that primary conceivability (in all its varieties except prima facie) 
is a much better guide to possibility because it explains via intensions what obtains in our world 
and what does not. To understand how primary conceivability performs this task, let us review 
how Chalmers uses intensions. 
Intensions are the distinctive ways Chalmers uses statements relative to worlds. If the 
world is a centred world (marked with a specified individual and time), then the world is actual, 
but if it is not centred, then it is a counterfactual. If S is to be evaluated in the actual world, then 
the intension is primary, but if S is to be evaluated in some possible world, then the intension is 
secondary. In primary conceivability, what we do is we make the hypothetical situation the 
actual world, and we make the hypothetical situation a counterfactual in secondary 
conceivability. For instance, when we primarily conceived Hesperus as Phosphorus, what we did 
was to conceive a situation in which Hesperus is Phosphorus and make that situation actual. 
                                                                                                                                                             
conceivable when S is not seen as impossible. In this way, van Cleve’s weak conceivability and Chalmers’ negative 
conceivability are similar, and van Cleve’s strong conceivability and Chalmers’ positive conceivability are similar. 
See, ibid, p. 9. 
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Likewise, when we secondarily conceive Hesperus as not Phosphorus what we did was to 
conceive a situation in which Hesperus is not Phosphorus and make that situation a 
counterfactual, hence, the empirical and the subjunctive natures of primary and secondary 
conceivability respectively.17 However, secondary conceivability (in all its varieties) never yields 
access to modality because it depends on a posteriori evaluation (of Hesperus and Phosphorus), 
and modality is essentially a priori.18 The primary intension of ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ makes 
it that whenever Hesperus is Phosphorus in any world, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is primarily 
possible or 1-possible. The secondary intension of S on the other hand makes it that whenever S 
is true in any world; S is secondarily possible or 2-possible. Primary and secondary necessities 
can likewise be analogously defined. 
For Chalmers, secondary possibility and secondary necessity make for how something 
can be metaphysically possible or necessary. The standard account states something is 
metaphysically necessary if it is true in all possible worlds. Therefore, if Hesperus is Phosphorus 
is true in all possible worlds, then ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is a metaphysical necessity. If the 
secondary intension of ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true, that is, if the world in which we 
evaluate ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is a counterfactual world, and Hesperus is still Phosphorus in 
that world, then it is a metaphysical necessity that ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, since, in our world, 
we already know that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Likewise, ‘Water is XYZ’ is metaphysically 
possible (not necessary) because even if ‘Water is XYZ’ is 2-possible it is not 2-necessary, given 
that Water is not XYZ in our world. Thus, unless we are interested specifically in metaphysical 
necessities (which very often we are not due to its edgy nature), Chalmers summarizes that; “if 
any variety of a priori conceivability entails possibility, it must be a variety of ideal primary 
conceivability, and the variety of possibility that is entailed must be primary possibility”.19  
3.3.2 The counterfactual theorists  
According to this group of philosophers, our epistemic access to modal facts is from our natural 
capacity to reason counterfactually and subjunctively. Understanding how the logic of 
counterfactuals and subjunctives works provides access to a sufficient modal epistemology.  
3.3.2.1 Williamson’s ‘from counterfactual knowledge to modal knowledge’ 
Williamson’s (2007) built his position on these three theses. (1) The difference in the subject 
matter and methodology of philosophy and other discipline is not very deep. (2) The distinctive 
subject matter of philosophy is metaphysical modalities and knowledge about metaphysical 
modality. (3)  There is no special cognitive capacity distinctive of philosophical thought. Based 
                                                 
17 This part of the argument is known as Two-Dimensionalism. Jackson (1998) also offers a similar version in his 
objection to physicalism. Two-Dimensionalism gives a novel approach to how we understand language. According 
to two-dimensionalists, all we need to understand a sentence or a word, is just the primary intension of the word or 
sentence, because, expressed sentences depend on the context of utterance, that is, the world in which it is uttered. 
18 This presupposes that primary conceivability is always a matter of apriority. Chalmers presents the following 
argument: “Primary conceivability is always an a priori matter. We consider specific ways the world might be, in 
such a way that the true character of the actual world is irrelevant. In doing so, empirical knowledge can be 
suspended, and only a priori reasoning is required … Secondary conceivability works quite differently. It is 
grounded in the idea that we can conceive of many counterfactual ways that the world might have been but is not … 
we acknowledge that the character of the actual world is fixed, and say to ourselves: if the situation had obtained, 
what would have been the case?”, ibid, p. 11. 
19 Ibid, p. 22. 
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on these three theses, Williamson posits that there must be a plausible way to subsume our 
capacity to discriminate metaphysical modalities under more general cognitive capacities used in 
ordinary life.20 There must be a way that shows how philosophers go about their business of 
analysing metaphysical modality (thesis 2) in a way that is comprehensible to everyone (thesis 3) 
because philosophy and other discipline are not too different as many would think (thesis 1). For 
Williamson, this plausible way is in our counterfactual reasoning: “metaphysical modalities are 
definable from counterfactual conditionals, and the epistemology of the former is a special case 
of the epistemology of the latter”.21 
 Avoiding the complications, which ensue in using the possible-worlds semantics to 
analyse counterfactuals, Williamson eschews the possible-worlds semantics and focuses on how 
actually we have counterfactual knowledge. In his view, we have counterfactual knowledge 
through imagination. If I see that the bush before the river stopped a rock sliding down a 
mountainside of rolling into the river, I will conclude, “Had the bush been absent, the rock would 
have ended up in the river”. Williamson argues that I could as well imagine the rock to be 
levitating instead of rolling down, but I did not because my perception of the rock and the slope 
and my understanding of how nature works has radically informed and disciplined my 
imagination.22 Thus, despite the influence of physics and the laws of nature, imagination alone is 
not sufficient in explaining how we have counterfactual knowledge. 
 What we need, according to Williamson, is a kind of ‘simulation’, where simulation 
involves the offline application of our cognitive process. To understand this, consider two 
distinct sentences A and B. We access and analyse these sentences as freestanding through our 
cognitive faculties. However, in the evaluation of the counterfactual conditional A □→ B (if A 
had held, then B would also have held), cognitive faculties are run offline, where ‘offline’ simply 
translates as ‘the most direct links with perception have been cut’. Williamson states, “We can 
schematize the process of evaluating a counterfactual conditional thus: the thinker imaginatively 
supposes the antecedent and counterfactually develops the supposition, adding further judgments 
within the supposition by reasoning, off-line predictive mechanisms, and other off-line 
judgments”.23 With simulation, Williamson connects imagination to counterfactual knowledge. 
 Even though simulation helps in the formation of counterfactual knowledge, we still need 
to demonstrate how counterfactual reasoning generates an epistemology of metaphysical 
modality. According to Williamson, “metaphysically modal thinking is logically equivalent to a 
special case of counterfactual thinking”.24 He achieved this by formulating a formal system, 
which generates the logic of modal operators from the logic of counterfactual conditionals. For 
him, anyone who has the capacity to understand how the logic of counterfactual conditionals 
works also has the capacity to understand the possibility and necessity operators. A good starting 
place, he argues, is the formulation of two constraints on the relation between counterfactual 
conditionals and metaphysical modalities. The first constraint is NECESSITY and it states that 
the strict conditional implies the counterfactual conditional. The second is POSSIBILITY, which 
                                                 
20 A. Casullo, ‘Counterfactuals and Modal Knowledge’, 2012, pp. 251-254. 
21 T. Williamson, ‘Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals’, 2007, p. 89. 
22 Ibid, p. 99. 
23 Ibid, p. 108. 
24 Ibid, p. 113. 
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states that the counterfactual conditional transmits possibility. For the sake of easy 
comprehension, Williamson’s system is deformalized below.25   
NECESSITY (N) 
□(A⊃B) ⊃ (A□→B) Suppose that A could not have 
held without B holding too; 
then if A had held, B would 
also have held. 
POSSIBILITY (P) 
(A□→B) ⊃ (◊A⊃◊B) Suppose that if A had held B 
would also have held; then if 
A may have held, B may also 
have held. 
(11) 
□(¬A⊃⊥) ⊃ (¬A□→⊥) 
Given (N), since A must hold 
or else there is a contradiction; 
then if A had not held, there 
would also have been a 
contradiction. 
(14) 
(¬A□→⊥) ⊃ (◊¬A⊃◊⊥) 
Given (P), since if A had not 
held, there would have been a 
contradiction; then, if A may 
not hold, there may also be a 
contradiction. 
(12) 
□A ⊃ □(¬A⊃⊥)  
Given (11), A always holds, if 
A must hold or else there is a 
contradiction. 
(15) 
(◊¬A⊃ ◊⊥) ⊃ □A  
Given (14), since if A may 
not hold, there may be a 
contradiction; then A always 
holds. 
(13) 
□A ⊃ (¬A □→⊥) 
Likewise, given (11), A always 
holds, if had A not held, there 
would have been a 
contradiction. 
(16) 
(¬A □→⊥) ⊃ □A  
Likewise, given (14), since if 
A had not held, there would 
have been a contradiction; 
then A always holds. 
(17) 
□A≡ (¬A □→⊥) 
Given (13) and (16), A always holds if and only if, had A not held, there would 
always have been a contradiction. 
(18) 
◊A≡ ¬ (A □→ ⊥) 
Given (17), it could be A if and only if, it is not the case that, if A had held, there 
would always have been a contradiction. 
(19)  
□A≡ (¬A □→ A) 
Given (17), it is always A if and only if, had A not held, A would have held. 
(20)  
◊A≡¬(A □→ ¬A) 
Given (18), it could be A if and only if, it is not the case that, if A had held, A 
would not have held. 
(21) 
□A≡ ∀p (p □→ A) 
Given (19), it is always A if and only if, for any whatever, if the whatever had 
held, A would have held. 
(22) 
◊A≡ ∃p¬ (p□→ ¬A) 
Given (20), it could be A if and only if, for some whatever, it is not the case that, 
if the whatever had held, A would not have held. 
 The strength of Williamson’s system lies in the truth of (17) and (18). (17) and (18) are 
definitions of necessity and possibility in terms of counterfactual conditionals, and the transition 
from (17) and (18) to (19) and (20) respectively solidifies the strength provided by the former. 
(19) and (20) claim that the ‘necessary’ is that which counterfactually implies its own negation, 
and the ‘possible’ is that which does not counterfactually imply its own negation. Likewise, (21) 
and (22) further solidify this strength. With these three definitions of necessity and possibility 
provided respectively by (17), (19), (21) on the one hand and (18), (20), (22) on the other, 
Williamson argues that the logic of counterfactual conditionals smoothly generates the logic of 
modal operators. In his view, this provides a grasp on how modal operators operate. Thus, when 
                                                 
25 The numbers from (11) to (22) correspond to the numbers of the formal statements being deformalized; although, 
the deformalized statements of (N) and (P) are Williamson’s not mine. See, ibid, p. 109-115. I refrained from using 
‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ in the explanation because ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ are precisely what we are 
working towards. That is, the goal is how the logic of counterfactual conditionals yields an epistemology of 
necessity and possibility. 
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we run our cognitive faculties offline during simulation of possibilities, we do this on the 
foreknowledge that through counterfactual conditionals we can generate valid and true cases of 
metaphysical modalities.  
3.3.2.2 Hill’s ‘reductive subjunctive conditionals’ 
Hill’s (2006) position on the ‘How We Know’ question is set in a broader context of 
demonstrating that the modal arguments for property dualism are seriously and irremediably 
flawed. He develops his position as a direct response to the claim that conceivability provides 
epistemic access to metaphysical possibilities. In his view, the conceivability accounts may have 
provided an analysis of the epistemology of metaphysical possibilities when they claim “a 
proposition counts as metaphysically possible if it is compatible with the propositions that are 
metaphysically necessary”.26 Hill argues that they leave unexplained our epistemic access to 
metaphysical necessity, particularly because they take as trivial that we have some sorts of 
independent access to metaphysical necessity. Thus, he concludes that conceivability does not 
provide us with satisfactory access to metaphysical modalities. Consequently, he proposes a 
tentative answer to the ‘How We Know’ question by contending that metaphysical modalities be 
reductively explained in terms of subjunctive conditionals. 
 Subjunctive conditionals are of the form If it were the case that P then it would be the 
case that Q. In Hill’s view, since subjunctive conditionals play a definitive role in everyday 
reasoning, a correct account of our epistemic access to metaphysical modalities via subjunctive 
conditionals will be a stable and robust account.27 He suggests that the link between subjunctive 
conditionals and the epistemology of metaphysical modalities lies in Lewis’ possible-worlds 
analysis of subjunctive conditionals. Hill’s system is also deformalized to aid easy reading and 
comprehension.28  
(16) □A = df ∼A > A. According to Lewis, ‘A is necessary’ is 
interdefinable with ‘if it were not the case 
that A, then it would have been the case that 
A’.  
(17) □A is true at a possible world W just in case 
A is true at every possible world that is 
accessible from W. 
According to Lewis, the truth-conditions of 
a proposition containing the necessity 
operator is analysed according to the 
possible worlds that are accessible from the 
world in which the proposition is true. 
(18) All possible worlds are included in the 
possible worlds that are accessible from W (that 
is, in the possible worlds that are relevant to the 
semantic evaluation of subjunctive conditionals 
with respect to W). 
Lewis makes the jump to (18) because of 
the standard picture of metaphysical 
necessity. According to this picture, if a 
proposition is metaphysically necessary, 
then it holds in all possible worlds, and not 
just in a restricted subset of the set of 
possible worlds.  
                                                 
26 C. Hill, ‘Modality, Modal Epistemology, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness’, 2006, p. 217. 
27 Ibid, p. 219. 
28 The numbers (16) to (19) correspond to Hill’s numbering of the axioms he employs in his paper. However, H1 to 
H3 are my representation of Hill’s axioms that were not numbered in the paper.  
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H1 Suppose that there is some respect R of 
comparison of worlds, and some degree D of 
similarity between worlds with respect to R, 
such that worlds must be similar to W in respect 
R to degree D in order to count as accessible 
from W (where W is any given world).29 
Hill explained why (18) is true with H1. In 
his view, R and D cannot be arbitrary. There 
must be some features of our practice of 
evaluating subjunctive conditionals that 
establish R and D. If this is true, our 
capacity to specify R and D must in the first 
place be able to provide the means to 
formulate a proposition that holds only in 
the worlds that lie outside the sphere of 
similarity that is determined by R and D. 
With this proposition, a meaningful 
conditional can be formulated and those 
worlds that lie outside the sphere of 
similarity are by that fact, accessible from 
the given worlds. Thus, all worlds; both 
those within the sphere of similarity and 
those outside are accessible from the sphere 
of accessibility of any given world. 
(19) □A is true at W just in case A is true at all 
possible worlds. 
If all the worlds accessible from W are all 
possible worlds, given H1, then (17) 
becomes (19). 
H2 □A = df (ПQ) (Q > A).30 Given (19), Hill advanced that for any 
whatever; if it were the case that the 
whatever holds, then it would still have 
been the case that A. This definition is 
interdefinable with ‘it is necessary that A’. 
H3 ◊A = df ∼ □∼A. Given (16), ‘it is possible that A’ is 
interdefinable with ‘it is not necessary that it 
is not A’. According to Hill, just as Lewis’ 
necessity operator expresses genuine 
metaphysical necessity, so this possibility 
operator expresses genuine metaphysical 
possibility. 
Above is Hill’s first argument that metaphysical necessity and metaphysical possibility 
can be reductively explained in terms of subjunctive conditionals. The second builds on the first 
in a sense and is somehow more complex than the first, and for these reasons, the second is not 
discussed here. With the validity of H2 secured, Hill moved to the conclusion that the Lewisian 
                                                 
29 H1 is not exactly framed in this way. Hill’s starting place was with the actual world; thus W according to him, is 
to be taken as the actual world even though he later expanded it to show that the result would still be the same had 
W been taken as any possible world. I have chosen to write H1 in this way and not in Hill’s style because I do not 
want to multiply the Hs. I would have needed to add an H2 to demonstrate how Hill showed that any possible world 
yields the same result as the actual world. See, ibid, pp. 221-222. 
30 According to Hill, the quantifier ПQ, is the universal substitutional quantifier which captures the idea that A 
would be the case no matter what else was the case. “A proposition of the form (ПQ) (. . .Q . . .) is true just in case 
every proposition that results from substituting a proposition for the variable Q in the matrix (. . .Q . . .) is true”. 
Ibid, p. 223. 
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subjunctive necessity is identical with genuine metaphysical necessity. Since the main reason he 
proposes his theory was to devise how we have access to metaphysical necessity, he need not 
bother with metaphysical possibility; all he needs is to generate a definition of the possibility 
operator from the necessity operator, and H3 achieved that. A closer analysis of H2 and H3 
makes clear that the truth they express is a logical truth. They both respectively define the 
necessity and possibility operators using subjunctive conditionals. Thus, Hill concludes that 
anyone who understands subjunctive conditionals understands how the necessity and possibility 
operators function.  
3.3.3 The understanding theorists 
According to the understanding theorists, epistemic access to modal facts is available through 
our understanding of the concepts employed in modal contexts. Only Bealer (2002) is discussed 
under this category.31   
3.3.3.1 Bealer’s determinate understanding 
The traditional account of necessity until Kripke (1980) draws a synonymy between necessity 
and apriority when it states that “p is necessary if and only if we know a priori that p”. Despite 
Kripke’s correction that the equivalence (…if and only if…) of this traditional account fails in 
both directions, Bealer (1996 and 1999) thinks that the traditional equivalence still holds for 
some kinds of propositions. He calls such propositions the ‘semantically stable propositions’. 
According to him, proposition p is semantically stable if and only if, necessarily, if p plays some 
cognitive role in the mental life of a community c, then it is necessary that for any other 
community c* in qualitatively the same epistemic situation as c, no proposition can play that role 
other than p itself.32 Arguably, virtually all central propositions of the traditional a priori 
disciplines – logic, mathematics and philosophy – are semantically stable, given Bealer’s 
definition of semantic-stability above. However, semantic-stability thus defined makes clear that 
the cognitive role played by the central propositions of the traditional a priori disciplines is 
necessary. Thus, a new problem arises in how to ascertain the veracity of the traditional 
disciplines’ central propositions since they tend to tell us what is necessarily the case. 
Responding to this new problem, Bealer (2002) defends an account of modal epistemology, 
which builds on our ability to understand. 
 According to Bealer (2002), the appropriate route to modal epistemology is through the 
proper understanding of our concepts. There are two senses in which we can ‘understand’ 
concepts. The first sense is a weak nominal sense whereby “a subject possesses a given concept 
at least nominally iff the subject has natural propositional attitudes toward propositions that have 
that concept as a constituent content”.33 The second is a robust sense, which involves 
understanding the concept in a determinate or indeterminate manner. A subject determinately 
understands a concept “if and only if (i) the subject at least nominally possesses the concept and 
(ii) the subject does not do this with misunderstanding or incomplete understanding or merely by 
                                                 
31 Peacocke (1997) also talks about understanding as a guide to modal epistemology but he is not discussed here. 
This is because, he defends a form of constraint modalism which quantifiers over ersatz worlds.  
32 G. Bealer, ‘Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance’, 2002, p. 72. 
33 Bealer, ibid, p. 103. 
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virtue of satisfying our attribution practices or many other such manners”.34 A subject 
indeterminately understands a concept if he does not determinately understand it. It is this second 
sense that Bealer thinks captures the appropriate notion of understanding, which generates access 
to metaphysical modality.  
 Bealer provides an example to explain the notion of determinate understanding. If a 
woman introduces a concept multigon through her journal, and she determinately understands 
this concept to mean any closed, straight-sided plane figure, or any closed, straight-sided plane 
figure with five or more sides. If she has never applied her multigon to our triangle or rectangle, 
Bealer proposes that when eventually she does, she would be able to intuit that it is possible for 
our triangle and rectangle to be a multigon if and only if being a multigon is having closed, 
straight sided planes. She would also be able to intuit that it is impossible for our triangle and 
rectangle to be a multigon if and only if being a multigon is having closed, straight sided planes 
of five or more sides. In this way, she would have truth-tracking intuitions because of her 
determinate understanding of multigon. Determinate understanding leads to a priori stability and 
thus to metaphysical possibility.  
 Take the woman to be filling the place of a variable x. Take her conceptual repertory to 
be c and take the level of her cognitive condition35 to be l. Take multigon to be filling the place 
of a proposition p. Take the mode of her understanding p which is determinate to be mode m, 
such that we can say she m-ly understands p. Thus, since x has cognitive condition l and 
conceptual repertory c, and x m-ly understands p, x can know the truth of p solely on the truth-
tracking intuitions generated when she attempts to systematize theoretically whether p is true. In 
order words, “once x achieves cognitive conditions l and conceptual repertory c, theoretical 
systematizations of x’s intuitions always yield the same verdict on p as long as p continues to be 
understood m-ly throughout”.36  In this way, we can say that x settles with a priori stability that p 
is true. x’s knowledge that p is true is a priori since all x needs to know the truth of p are some 
cognitive condition of some level l, some conceptual repertory c and m-ly understanding of p; all 
of which are essentially a priori. x’s knowledge that p is true is also stable because for any 
similar l* and c*, if x has both l* and c*, and x m-ly understands p, the intuitions x elicit in that 
situation would also affirms the truth of p.  
 Using this notion of a priori stability, Bealer gives a definition of determinate 
understanding, which shows how metaphysical possibilities are known. According to him, 
“determinate understanding = the mode m of understanding such that, necessarily, for all x and 
property-identities p37 understood m-ly by x, p is true iff it is possible for x to settle with a priori 
stability that p is true”.38 For Bealer, the sufficiency-claim (…iff it is possible for x to settle with 
a priori stability that p is true) is a correctness property of the definition because it tells us about 
the potential quality of x’s intuitions. By potential quality, he means, it is metaphysically 
possible for x to get into a cognitive situation, such that from that point on, the theoretical 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Take cognitive conditions to be such things as intelligence, ontogenetic make-up, etc. Take conceptual repertory 
as the ability to use terms distinctively for designated meanings. 
36 Bealer, ibid, p. 104. 
37 Take ‘property-identities p’ to be any similar proposition p* which expresses the explanatory content of p such 
that p and p* are identical with regard to their properties.  
38 Bealer, ibid. 
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systematizations of x’s intuitions yield only the truth regarding p, provided that x m-ly 
understands p all the while. On the other hand, the necessity-claim (…necessarily, for all x and 
property-identities p understood m-ly by x) is a completeness property of the definition because it 
tells us about the potential quantity of x’s intuitions. By potential quantity, Bealer means, it is 
metaphysically possible for x (or any counterpart of x) to have enough intuitions to reach a priori 
stability regarding the question of p’s truth, provided that x m-ly understands p all the while. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Pressure is on epistemologists to give a reasonable account of modal epistemology, and modal 
reliabilism increases this pressure. Reliabilism (about knowledge) “has it that knowledge is 
reliable true belief, that is, true belief which has been acquired in a reliable way”,39 and a process 
is reliable “just in case it tends to produce beliefs that are true rather than false”.40 Under this 
notion of reliabilism, modal reliabilism becomes the doctrine that an object or concept or 
principle or theory counts as evidence if and only if there is an appropriate kind of modal tie 
between what it delivers and the truth.41 For example, over the course of the past years, many 
epistemologists42 have defended the view that intuition is a tool for metaphysical analyses. If 
intuition performs this role, then intuition is modally reliable as evidence for the autonomous 
methodology of metaphysics. This is because there is an appropriate modal tie between what 
intuition delivers and the truth; at least to the extent to which metaphysics is implicitly modal.43 
If modal reliabilism is tenable to the extent described above, then modal reliabilism 
entails modal rationalism. Chalmers (2010) gives a definition of modal rationalism. According to 
him, modal rationalism is the doctrine that the a priori access to modality creates a constitutive 
tie between the modal and rational domains.44 Building on Chalmers’ definition therefore, 
modality is rational, and if modality is rational then it is epistemically explanatory. 
Consequently, the difficulty in epistemically explaining modality creates a tension between 
modal rationalism and modal reliabilism. It is either modality is not rational and so no epistemic 
explanation is needed, or, it is rational, and if rational, it needs explanation. Since it is standardly 
taken that modality is rational, then there is pressure on epistemologists to provide an adequate 
account of modal epistemology. 
In order to ease this difficulty and epistemically explain modality, we need to understand 
(1) what constitutes modality and (2) how we have modal knowledge. Concerning (1), we have 
LMR. Concerning (2), we are nowhere near a satisfactory account, because our solution for (1) 
seems to deprive (2) of any reasonable solution. Given LMR, what seems necessary for modal 
truth seems to make modal knowledge impossible, à la Benacerraf’s style for mathematical truth. 
It is little wonder then, that Lewis separated modal knowledge from causal acquaintance. 
                                                 
39 P. Baumann, ‘Reliabilism – Modal, Probabilistic or Contextualist’, 2009, p. 77. 
40 A. Goldman, ‘What is Justified Belief?’, 1992a, p. 113. He also developed the theory that reliability is a modal 
notion. See, Goldman (1986, 1988 and 1992b). 
41 Bealer, ibid, p. 102. 
42 See, Bealer (1996 and 1999), Sosa (2005 and 2007), Brown (1991), Chalmers (2014) and Rowbottom (2014). 
43 Refer to section 2.5 above for Lowe’s argument on the implicit modal nature of metaphysics.  
44 Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness, 2010, pp. 191-192. 
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 Lewis’ attempt to separate modal knowledge from acquaintance, does not help us 
understand how we have modal knowledge. More importantly, his conclusion on modal 
epistemology that “just like with mathematical knowledge, he is more confident of what he 
knows about metaphysical modality than he is of how he knows about metaphysical modality”, 
does not inhibit attempts at providing an account of modal epistemology. Thus, some recent 
accounts of modal epistemology were considered. These accounts include, (1) those who think 
we have modal knowledge because we have the capacity to conceive modal facts, and thus they 
claim that conceivability is a guide to possibility. (2) those who think access to modal 
epistemology is in logic, specifically the logic of subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals. 
These philosophers think that since subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals are ubiquitous in 
everyday reasoning, anyone who understands this logic eo ipso understands the logic of modal 
operators because the former entails the latter. (3) those who think that if we understand the 
concept used in the construction of modal statements, we would be able to use the understood-






Answering the research question 
 
4.1 Recapping earlier chapters 
In chapter 1, a question was posed as guide to the structure of this paper. The question was; 
“Given the intelligibility of modal propositions; what is the acquaintance that we need?” Chapter 
2 explains that the kind of acquaintance we need is modal acquaintance. Setting aside for a 
moment the development of modal acquaintance, chapter 3 critically analysed the prevalent 
accounts of modal epistemology. Lewis, Yablo, Chalmers, Williamson, Hill and Bealer were 
considered in this respect. Lewis simply asks us not to serve epistemology to the detriment of 
modality. The recent accounts will be revisited in section 4.2 to determine whether they offer 
accounts of modal justification. Section 4.3 then explains why modal acquaintance provides a 
straightforward way to an account of modal justification. Section 4.4 begins by explaining why 
the recent accounts fail to offer accounts of modal justification, and explains how modal 
acquaintance succeeds where the recent accounts failed. Section 4.5 gives a general conclusion 
to the thesis. 
4.2 LMR and the recent responses to the ‘How We Know’ question 
The following characters will be relied upon in this section. 
 Pj: the counterfactual statement made by John that “If the tree were 
five feet tall, you would not have had this problem”. 
 Wj: the possible world in which the antecedent and the consequent of 
Pj is true. 
 Counterpart-longifolia: the tree in Wj that is five feet tall. 
 Counterpart-Jerry: the individual in Wj whose garden contains the counterpart-
longifolia. 
 Actual-longifolia:  the actual tree in Jerry’s garden that is twenty feet tall. 
4.2.1 LMR and the understanding theory  
For Bealer, we have modal knowledge if we determinately understand the concepts used in 
modal statements. Determinate understanding is the mode m of understanding such that, 
necessarily, for all subject x and property-identities p understood m-ly by x, p is true if and only 
if it is possible for x to settle with a priori stability that p is true. We take for granted that John is 
in a satisfactory cognitive condition of some level l such that those who listens to him know he is 
not demented, and he has a sufficient conceptual repertory c such that he distinctively could use 
longifolia (or any other words he uses) for a designated meaning. We also take for granted that 
John m-ly understands the term ‘longifolia’.  
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This is plausible on two fronts. (1) if anyone – say Jerry – were to be in the same 
cognitive condition and have the same conceptual repertory which John had, Jerry would have 
encountered the truth of Pj because he would elicit the same truth tracking intuitions as John 
when he asks himself whether Pj is true. (2) if there is a separate situation of distinct cognitive 
condition l* that is as large as l and a conceptual repertory c* that includes c, and John has both 
l* and c*, he would have also encountered the truth of Pj because the intuitions he would elicit as 
he asks himself whether Pj is true would confirm the truth of Pj in that situation also. Thus, on 
the presupposition that John already had a priori stability that Pj is true, we can say that John 
came to have the modal knowledge which Pj expresses because he determinately understands the 
concepts used in Pj. 
 If we opt for the alternative and say that John has no a priori stability that Pj is true, 
Bealer’s system implodes, and there is no way to apply the system to LMR. Since this section 
aims to apply the responses to the ‘How We Know’ question to modal realism, then assuming 
that John already had a priori stability appears to be the only choice. In addition, if we say that 
John had not taken out time to consider (1), and that (2) has the faintest chances of occurring, 
then it is arguable that no one ever has a priori stability about the truth of anything; not even the 
woman in Bealer’s example. This would be too much an implication, especially when we can 
rationally intuit that Bealer’s argument holds some degree of truth on the matter. With these as 
premises, it suffices to say that the above supposition that John already had a priori stability only 
extends as far as the length of approval we are generous to give Bealer’s argument.  
John’s access to the knowledge of the counterpart-longifolia depends strictly on whether 
he m-ly understands the concepts used in Pj, which in turn depends on whether John has a priori 
stability that Pj is true. If we think for a moment on the term ‘understanding’ itself, it appears 
that ‘understanding’ is epistemically dependent on some levels of experiential relation between 
‘who is understanding’ and what is designated by what has some contextually dependent degree 
of similarity with ‘what is being understood’. Generally, one cannot claim to understand a modal 
concept c (at least not in the way Bealer’s m-ly understanding works) if one has never been in 
some quasi or real experiential relation with what c* designates, where c* is what has some 
contextually dependent degree of similarity with c. Morganti and Tahko reiterate this point when 
they challenged Lowe’s position, which views ‘understanding of essence’ as our access to modal 
epistemology.1 Let us return to the woman in Bealer’s example to illustrate this.  
The woman introduces the term ‘multigon’ for her specific usage and she m-ly 
understands multigon. But if she has never been in any quasi or real experiential relation with at 
least one member of the ‘-gon’ family (pentagon, nonagon, square, octagon, and so on), it is not 
clear how she has such conceptual repertory to use multigon in the way she does. Multigon for 
her means ‘any closed, straight-sided plane figure, or any closed, straight-sided plane figure with 
five or more sides’, and it seems clear that this sort of meaning is only available to her only if, 
she had been in a quasi or real experiential relationship with at least one of the members of the ‘-
gon’ family in the past. Thus, it is arguably the case that determinate understanding (and any 
form of understanding used by other understanding theories) is epistemically dependent on some 
                                                 
1 See, section 2.5 for an earlier mention of this. See also, Morganti and Tahko, ‘Moderately Naturalistic 
Metaphysics’, 2016, p. 28, for an elaborate discussion. 
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levels of experiential relation between ‘who is understanding’ and what is designated by what 
has some contextually dependent degree of similarity with ‘what is being understood’. Since the 
understanding theory works in this way, then it employs causal acquaintance, and as Lewis 
makes clear, possible worlds are causally isolated. As such, the understanding theories are in 
essence not compatible with the realist’s construal of modality and fail to offer an account of 
modal justification. 
4.2.2 LMR and the counterfactual theories 
According to Williamson, the logic of counterfactual conditionals generates the logic of 
necessity and possibility. Williamson gives three definitions each, for necessity and possibility in 
counterfactual terms. Since the case of John and Pj is a case of possibility, Williamson’s 
definitions of necessity are skipped. His first definition of possibility holds more promise than 
the other two and as such, they are also skipped.2,3 According to the first definition, A is possible, 
if and only if, it is not the case that, had A not held, there would have been a contradiction [(18): 
◊A≡ ¬ (A □→ ⊥)]. Under this definition, we can say that Pj is possible if and only if, it is not the 
case that, had Pj not held, there would have been a contradiction. If this is correct, then Pj and all 
metaphysical possibilities are eo ipso possible, because there would not have been a 
contradiction had they not held.  
According to Hill, we can arrive at a logical definition of the necessity operator from 
subjunctive conditionals, and once we have this definition, we can safely generate a logical 
definition of the possibility operator from it. Simply stated, the logic of subjunctive conditionals 
provides access to modal knowledge. Hill’s strategy differs from Williamson’s in that he did not 
generate logical definitions of the necessity and possibility operators simultaneously. As such, 
his definition of the necessity operator may not be skipped. The definition states that A is 
necessary if for any whatever, if it were the case that the whatever holds, it would still have been 
the case that A [H2: □A = df (ПQ) (Q>A)]. With this definition in place, Hill generated a 
definition for the possibility operator as follows: it is possible that A when it is not necessary that 
it is not A [H3 ◊A = df ∼□∼A]. Under this possibility operator definition, we can say Pj is 
possible if for any whatever, if it is not the case that were the whatever holds, it would still have 
been the case that Pj.  
The counterfactual theories ask us to accept that the logic of subjunctive conditionals 
enables us to have modal knowledge. However, it sounds dubious that John has this kind of 
highly trained intuition through which he would have understood the logic counterfactual 
conditionals in this way. John may have never taken any class in logic. The plausibility of this 
claim leaves largely unexplained, how this sophisticated logic of counterfactual conditionals is to 
be understood. How we understand this sophisticated logic would remain unexplained even if we 
grant that (1) the logic of counterfactual conditionals generates the logic of modal operators and 
                                                 
2 The second definition of possibility states that “it is possible that A if and only if, it is not the case that, if A had 
held, A would not have held” [(20): ◊A≡ ¬ (A □→ ¬A)]. Under this second definition, Pj and any other carefully 
constructed modal statements are possible because they would not be possible were they not possible. 
3 The third definition states that “it is possible that A if and only if for some whatever, it is not the case that, if the 
whatever had held, A would not have held” [(22): ◊A≡ ∃p¬ (p□→ ¬A)]. Under this third definition, Pj and any other 
carefully constructed modal statements are possible because for some whatever that would have made them 
impossible, if the whatever had not held, they would still have been possible. 
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(2) we use counterfactual reasoning habitually. Consequently, if we cannot say John understands 
the logic of counterfactual conditionals in this way, to say that he moved from such logic to a 
logic of modal operators is far-fetched. This might seem like a straw man, because sympathizers 
of the counterfactual theories may well argue that we can say the same thing about every rule of 
logic and in fact, about most philosophical theories. They would be correct, but this is not the 
main concern regarding the counterfactual theories.  
Whether or not Williamson and Hill anticipated this problem when they added the caveat 
that “only those who understand the logic of subjunctives can understand the logic of modal 
operators”, is left as moot. The main concern here is that this caveat only moves the issue a step 
backward because some kind of identification criteria for those who understand this sophisticated 
logic is now required. Thus, maybe John understands this sophisticated logic or maybe he does 
not, may never be known because neither Williamson not Hill gives such identification criteria. 
Also, if we suppose that understanding this sophisticated logic comes naturally to those with the 
trained intuitions of logic and philosophy, we only exacerbate the problem. This is because if we 
make this kind of supposition, we exclude a multitude of people who expresses modal statements 
in their everyday conversations. For instance, it seems trivial that John has a comfortable idea of 
what he was talking about when he uttered Pj. Strictly speaking therefore, the counterfactual 
theories are not satisfactory accounts of modal epistemology for the realist’s construal of 
modality.  
4.2.3 LMR and the conceivability theories 
Yablo suggests that we can know facts about a given metaphysical possibility if we can imagine 
a possible world and satisfy ourselves that the metaphysical possibility is true in the imagined 
world. On this foreknowledge, John imagines Wj, and he satisfies himself that Wj verifies the 
truth of Pj. Furthermore, Yablo explains that imagining works in this way: “the possibility of 
what we imagine is grounded only after we are able to imagine a world that verifies what we 
imagine”. Thus, there is no truth in the argument that John had prior knowledge that a fully-
grown five-feet-tall longifolia can exist. It was after imagining the counterpart-longifolia in Wj 
that John realizes that the actual-longifolia could have been that five-feet-tall longifolia he 
imagined. According to Yablo therefore, John’s modal knowledge about the actual-longifolia is 
epistemically explained by John’s imagining of Wj and John’s satisfaction that Wj verifies Pj.  
For Chalmers, if any variety of a priori conceivability entails possibility, it must be a 
variety of ideal primary conceivability, and the variety of possibility entailed must be primary 
possibility. Whatever is primarily conceivable, is either 1-possible (or necessary) or 2-possible 
(or necessary), where 1-possibility is a consequence of primary intension and 2-possibility, of 
secondary intension. 1-possibility (or necessity) is epistemic possibility (or necessity), and 2-
possibility (or necessity), is metaphysical possibility (or necessity). 1-possibility is when the 
hypothetical situation is evaluated as the actual world, and 2-possibility is when the hypothetical 
situation is evaluated as a counterfactual. Following Chalmers, Pj can only be 2-possible because 
Wj is the counterfactual world where the antecedent and consequent of Pj is true. Pj is not 2-
necessary because we already know that there are no such things as fully-grown five-feet-tall 
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longifolia in at least our world.4 Furthermore, Chalmers also argues that 2-possibility entails 1-
possibility, that is, what is metaphysically possible is not epistemically impossible.5 Thus, the 2-
possibility of Pj entails its 1-possibility. It is precisely because Pj is true in Wj, that enables John 
to know about it.  
The conceivability theories fare better than the understanding and counterfactual theories. 
According to Yablo, it is in imagining that Pj is true in Wj that made John became aware of the 
possibility of the counterpart-longifolia’s existence, and from there, knowing facts about the 
counterpart-longifolia, for example, that it is five feet tall. Likewise, if according to Chalmers, 
the 2-possibility of Pj makes Pj 1-possible, then John did not conjure up the existence of the 
counterpart-longifolia from his conceiving it. Rather, he was able to know about the counterpart-
longifolia precisely because the counterpart-longifolia already existed in Wj. But we are only 
able to imagine or conceive those modal objects which are recombined6 from duplicate-parts of 
this-worldly objects. It seems an impossible feat to imagine or conceive modal objects that are 
not recombined from this-worldly objects. These are alien possibilities and as reckoned by most 
philosophers, describing what/how they are, is a feat yet to be achieved.7 It is safe to conclude 
then, that the conceivability theories pass as candidates for how to we acquire modal knowledge 
through modal acquaintance. There is a seemingly insurmountable problem for the conceivability 
theories. Bailey (2007) identifies this problem.  
According to Bailey, conceivability is a subjective property, while metaphysical modality 
is usually taken to be mind-independent, and that it is not clear how to bridge the gap between 
the subjective and the mind-independent. It is not clear whether there is a total disconnection 
between conceivability and the mind-independent modal objects. But, if there is no total 
disconnection, what kind of connection exists between them? Does conceivability somehow 
force a correspondence of modal thoughts here in the actual world with modal facts there in 
possible worlds? If conceivability does not force such a correspondence – and surely, it does not, 
since possibilities are not of our own making –, then how does conceivability help us gain access 
to modal epistemology? Let us call this the Bailey-problem. The Bailey-problem incapacitates 
the conceivability theories in being a satisfactory epistemological account for a genuine modal 
realist. Thus, even though the conceivability theories are closer to a sufficient account of modal 
epistemology for the modal realist than the counterfactual and understanding theories, they are 
nonetheless unable to provide justification for our modal knowledge. 
4.3 Acquaintance and justification 
Justification comes in degree, that is, “to a first approximation, we can identify justification as a 
normative property that comes in degrees, and that lies in the near neighbourhood of what 
                                                 
4 Here, biology is taken as stable in our world, so that there are no purple cows in our world precisely because cow’s 
DNA does not allow such complexion. Likewise, it is a matter of biological stability in our world that there are no 
fully-grown five-feet-tall longifolia in our world. This is built on a similar argument offered by van Inwagen (1998). 
5 See, Chalmers, The Character of the Consciousness, p. 149.  
6 Recombination is a Lewisian principle that advocates the generation of worldly objects from duplicates of another 
one or two world, where duplicates are entities with the same intrinsic properties. See, On the Plurality of Worlds, 
pp. 89-92 for the principle of recombination and pp. 61-62 for intrinsicness and duplication. 
7  See for example, Lewis, New Work for a Theory of Universals, 1983, p. 362. 
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distinguishes true belief from knowledge”.8 To generalize, justification may be divided into 
inferential and non-inferential justification, and non-inferential justification distinguishes true 
belief from knowledge more than inferential justification. Arguably, most justifiers give 
inferential justification because such justification would be layered. For instance, suppose I have 
a true belief that there is a red tomato on the table. The justification I have for this belief may be 
seeing the red tomato on the table, the trustworthiness of memory (perhaps, I placed the tomato 
there some few minutes ago), the trustworthiness of testimony (perhaps, my friend whom I trust 
testifies to it) and so on. However, these sorts of justifiers were ultimately inferred from more 
basic inferential justifiers such as the reliability of sight (it has never turn out to be a 
hallucination after I claimed to have seen an object), the reliability of memory (if my memory is 
not reliable, I cannot trust it, perhaps, it has never failed to be accurate and that is why I could 
trust it in the first place), the reliability of testimony, and so on. Likewise, these more basic 
inferential justifiers, were also inferred from more grounded basic inferential justifiers, and the 
inference continues. The inference only stops when non-inferential justification is reached and 
acquaintance yields such non-inferential kind of justification. 
 Fumerton (1995) explains how acquaintance yields non-inferential justification. 
According to him, acquaintance yields non-inferential justification of a belief that P “when one 
has the thought that P and one is acquainted with the fact that P, the thought that P, and the 
relation of correspondence holding between the thought that P and the fact that P”.9 Thus, these 
three components must be present before acquaintance can yield non-inferential justification; (i) 
thought, (ii) fact and (iii) relation of correspondence holding between thought and fact. Fumerton 
reiterates, no single act of acquaintance of (i) or (ii) or (iii) yields non-inferential justification, 
but whenever the three acts of acquaintance work together, they yield non-inferential 
justification. Every non-acquaintance-yielded-justification for true belief is inferred from an 
acquaintance-yielded-justification, and the acquaintance-yielded-justification is itself not inferred 
from any other justification. 
 Furthermore, Fumerton explains that acquaintance is not just a source of non-inferential 
justification; it is also a source of infallible justification. Earlier in section 2.4, facts were defined 
as non-linguistic complexes, which consist in entities exemplifying properties such that worlds 
contain facts long before they contain minds. Thus, facts mirror reality and veridicality is, in a 
sense, a function of facts. That is, in believing that P, being acquainted with the fact that P makes 
P true. Before proceeding on the analysis of how acquaintance yields infallible justification, a 
little bit of clarity is needed here because two critical questions ensue from the analysis of facts 
and veridicality. (1) Do minds somehow force a structure on the world? (2) Do minds determine 
what is true or false about the world? Fumerton only gives answer for the first question; he 
assumes the answer to the second question is obvious. In his view, the world comes to us with 
too many differences for us to be bothered noticing all of them. He thinks the mind imposes 
order to the chaotic way in which the world comes to us. Thus, he thinks minds force structure 
on the world. Concerning the second question, he took for granted that his position on the truth 
of P as a result of acquaintance with the fact that P suggests a truth dependence of P on the 
                                                 
8 Plantinga, ‘Epistemic Justification’, 1986, p. 4. 
9 Metaepistemology and Scepticism, p. 75. 
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acquaintance with the fact that P.10 In any case, the oversight is not fatal to his theory as it can 
easily be made clear.  
The truth of P does not depend on the acquaintance with the fact that P. P has always 
been true since P is a fact and as we have seen, facts were in the world long before minds 
develop. We would only not know the truth of P until we are acquainted with the fact that P, and 
it is the assent to the truth by the mind that counts in justification, at least to the extent to which 
justification is an epistemic property of the subject. Thus, we can answer ‘yes’ to (1), but must 
say ‘no’ to (2). Let us now return to how acquaintance yields infallible justification. Unlike 
Fumerton, I am more comfortable with “in believing that P, being acquainted with the fact that P 
makes P true for us”. As earlier explained above, being acquainted with the fact that P is the 
second component needed for acquaintance to yield non-inferential justification. Thus, we can 
say the source of justification for any belief includes the very fact that makes the belief true for 
us. This is where I think Fumerton’s theory does better than externalist accounts of epistemic 
justification.11 Most times, these accounts do not require the inclusion of the very fact that makes 
the belief true for us. This is probably because for the externalist, the fact mirroring any belief in 
reality is not important, what is important is the inherent truth of the belief. For example, in 
believing that the tomato is red, Fumerton requires the subject’s acquaintance with the fact that 
makes him believe that the tomato is red, whereas, the externalists only require that it is true that 
the tomato is red. Put succinctly, the fact that makes true a belief for us is not included in 
externalist accounts of justification. Following Fumerton therefore, acquaintance yields infallible 
justification precisely because the very fact that makes true for us the belief is included in the 
source of justification.   
 Concerning modal knowledge, the three components highlighted by Fumerton also must 
be present before modal acquaintance yield non-inferential and infallible justification. 
Consequently, we have (i) modal thoughts, (ii) modal facts and (iii) the correspondence holding 
between modal thoughts and modal facts, as the three components needed before we can have 
modal acquaintance with modal facts. Evidently, no argument is needed to demonstrate (i), 
because everyday reasoning is replete with modal thoughts (see arguments from Melia in section 
1.2.1). Also, even though focus is on the philosophical kind of modal thoughts, no arguments 
will still be required. This is because the absurdity of modal nihilism concerning philosophical 
modality has already been presented. It suffices to state then that (i) is immediately before 
consciousness. Concerning (ii), this study has already established that modal facts are precisely 
the populations of possible worlds under the Lewisian modal realism framework. Although (iii) 
was mentioned in section 2.4.1, no analysis was carried out. Perhaps, the correspondence relation 
is, as Fumerton argues, like acquaintance in that it is sui generis, not like anything else, cannot 
be informatively subsumed under a genus, and cannot be analysed into any less problematic 
concepts.12 To the extent that modal justification is our goal, Fumerton’s analysis of the 
                                                 
10 Ibid, pp. 77-79. 
11 I call them externalist accounts only to the extent to which not all components required for justification is internal 
to the subject. I do not mean that they take justification as an external affair. To reemphasize, epistemic justification 
is an internal affair.  
12 Ibid, p. 76. 
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correspondence relation is soft-pedalled. The correspondence relation holding between modal 
thoughts and modal facts is an analysable concept.  
4.4 LMR and modal acquaintance  
Earlier in section 2.4.2, in the discussion of modal acquaintance, it was argued that modal 
thoughts are true when they correspond to modal facts. Since modal facts are causally isolated in 
possible worlds, the Bailey-problem is given more vigour. In fact, the Bailey-problem as 
explained in section 4.2.3, challenges any account of modal epistemology, which operates within 
the framework of modal realism. As such, it was imperative to incorporate the recent accounts 
into LMR to see if they can explain how we have modal knowledge in the possible-worlds 
framework. Setting aside the inherent faults of these recent accounts, it is easily noticeable that 
the counterfactual and understanding theories, like the conceivability theories, proffer a 
subjective access to modal epistemology. Thus, like the conceivability theories, the 
counterfactual and the understanding theories are challenged by the Bailey-problem. I have 
claimed that modal acquaintance does a better job than this trio does, as such, it is incumbent on 
me to demonstrate how modal acquaintance surmounts the Bailey-problem. It is such 
demonstration that impels the soft-pedalling of Fumerton’s view on the correspondence relation.  
The correspondence relation holding between modal facts and modal thoughts is an 
equivalence relation. This was why I earlier claimed that even though we are modally acquainted 
with modal facts through our direct awareness of modal thoughts, the “being without the 
intermediary of any process of inference”, which is a necessary condition for acquaintance, is not 
blocked. The correspondence relation is an equivalence relation because for all modal thoughts a 
and b, and modal fact c in a set of correspondence C, the following holds. 
(i) Reflexivity [aCa, bCb and cCc]: a modal thought corresponds to itself and a modal 
fact corresponds to itself. 
(ii) Symmetry [if aCb then bCa, if aCc then cCa and if bCc then cCb]: modal thoughts 
correspond to one another if at least one of them corresponds to a modal fact. In 
addition, when a modal thought corresponds to a modal fact, then the modal fact also 
corresponds to the modal thought.   
(iii) Transitivity [if aCb and bCc then aCc]: when one or more modal thoughts correspond 
to one another, and one of them correspond to a given modal fact, then the rest modal 
thoughts also correspond to the same modal fact.13  
   When more than one modal thought are members of a set with a modal fact, the 
assumption is that more than one rational subject forms the modal thoughts, precisely; n number 
of modal thoughts equals n number of rational subjects. These modal thoughts may not 
essentially be identical in all minute details, but they have to correspond to one modal fact. In 
addition, a given modal fact could be true in more than one world. When this is the case, then d – 
the other modal fact that is a member of the same set with a, b and c – also corresponds to c. In 
                                                 
13 In fact, the relation of correspondence is also Euclidean [if cCa and cCb then aCb]: when a modal thought 
corresponds to a modal fact, and another modal thought corresponds to the same modal fact, then both modal 
thoughts correspond to each other. 
49 
 
addition, d will be essentially identical with c in every minute detail because any difference in 
their intrinsic or extrinsic characters makes them different modal facts, in which case, they could 
not be members of the same set in the first place. Once d corresponds to c, then ex hypothesi the 
equivalence relation holds. In fact, one can multiply the number of modal thoughts and modal 
facts to whatever finite limit desired, perhaps, a hundred persons believe that “Obama could have 
been the 46th President of the USA” and the modal fact that “Obama is the 46th President of the 
USA” might be true in hundred possible worlds. In as much as the modal thoughts and the modal 
facts all members of the same set, the correspondence that holds among them is an equivalence 
relation. As such, modal thoughts are exclusively constituted by the modal facts, with which they 
correspond. There is nothing in modal thoughts that is not a composition of modal facts. But how 
do we know which modal facts our modal thoughts correspond to? 
4.4.1 Threshold 
Earlier in section 4.2.3, we saw that all and only those modal objects we can imagine are those 
that are recombined from duplicate-parts of this-worldly facts. Let us call this kind of modal 
facts, category-1 modal facts and those, which we cannot imagine because they are recombined 
from duplicate-parts of otherworldly facts as category-2 modal facts. A category-1 modal fact 
will have threshold in our world because at least one of its recombined parts is a duplicate-part 
of an object from our world. A category-2 modal fact will, by the same standard, lack threshold 
in our world. The same category-2 modal fact will have threshold in other worlds if and only if, 
at least one of its recombined parts is traceable to any fact in those worlds. Similarly, modal 
facts, which are category-1 in our world, are category-2 in infinitely many worlds. Thus, when I 
say category-1 modal facts hereafter, I mean category-1 modal facts relative to our world. 
Therefore, in any world, modal thoughts correspond to modal facts if and only if those modal 
facts have threshold in that world. But in what way does threshold conserve acquaintance? 
 No doubt, information does not flow among possible worlds and as such, even though 
cross-world duplication and recombination sufficiently generates threshold, it remains obscure 
how acquaintance is conserved by threshold. Firstly, the kind of acquaintance that exists between 
modal objects and us is modal acquaintance, and as we have seen, it is a non-causal relation and 
a built-in feature of the conscious state. It is also the relation we have with modal facts through 
the modal thoughts, which correspond to them. Arguably, we are not directly aware of modal 
facts, at least not in the standard sense in which ‘direct awareness’ is used as in causal 
acquaintance. In addition, in the analyses of modal acquaintance above, our pseudo direct 
awareness with modal facts is evidently mediated by modal thoughts. But this is mistaken and 
we already know why. Arguments had already been offered stating that the correspondence 
between modal thoughts and modal facts is an equivalence relation, such that modal thoughts are 
exclusively constituted by the modal facts they correspond to. Secondly, we can only form 
singular thoughts about category-1 modal facts and category-1 modal facts are precisely those 
modal facts that are generated through cross-world duplication and recombination. Thirdly, as 
pointed out in the ‘closest identifier’ argument, thoughts are all we have to show for 
philosophical modality. Let us now connect these three points to demonstrate how cross-world 
duplication and recombination conserves acquaintance.  
1. Modal thoughts are all we have to show for philosophical modality. 
2. Modal thoughts as thoughts simpliciter are legitimate objects of acquaintance. 
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3. Modal thoughts always correspond to category-1 modal facts. 
4. Category-1 modal facts are generated from cross-world duplication and recombination. 
5. The correspondence of modal thoughts to category-1 modal facts allows modal 
acquaintance.14 
Although, already explained earlier in section 2.4.1, it is important to reemphasize that 
the correspondence of thoughts to facts is not translatable into the causal dependence of thoughts 
on facts. This is not just because facts do not directly cause thoughts, but also because, if modal 
facts directly cause modal thoughts, then the threshold thesis is an utter waste of time. Modal 
facts could have been left there in possible worlds since after all; they can directly cause modal 
thoughts here in the actual world. In addition, we may not rest on our oars and become content 
with the lack of causal dependency of thoughts on facts; so that we leave modal facts there in 
possible worlds and still claim that, our thoughts here in the actual world somehow correspond to 
them. This is because we would have to present an ontological explanation of the 
correspondence we claim exists between modal facts there in possible worlds and modal 
thoughts here in the actual world.  
These problems highlight the importance of the threshold thesis because in it, we have 
such an ontological explanation. With threshold, we need not worry about modal facts, which are 
seemingly very isolated out there in possible worlds. Modal thoughts correspond to modal facts 
in as much as those modal facts have threshold in our world. In this way, the Bailey-problem can 
be boycotted with the aid of the threshold thesis. Consequently, by incorporating and 
establishing itself on threshold, modal acquaintance escapes the Bailey-problem. Modal 
acquaintance also makes clear what possibilities are knowable: only those that have threshold, 
those of category-1 are knowable. Threshold is an important thesis with far reaching importance 
and usefulness than the scope of this research. For example, it is here used to explain how modal 
acquaintance escapes the Bailey-problem but it can also be employed to explain how 
conceivability is a guide to possibility, and how the counterfactual and understanding theories 
yield access to modal epistemology (more on this in section 4.4.3). For now, let us consider with 
Pj, how modal acquaintance works with possibilities.  
“If the tree were five feet tall, you would not have this problem” John said to Jerry. We 
have agreed that John’s belief is true because it is satisfied in w1 where a counterpart-longifolia is 
five feet tall. Thus, all that remains for John to have modal knowledge is the justification of his 
belief. I have said John is justified because he is modally acquainted with the modal fact his 
belief describes, in that he is directly aware of the modal thought which corresponds to that 
modal fact. John’s modal thought is exclusively constituted by the modal fact in Wj in such a 
manner that when he is directly aware of this modal thought, he is modally acquainted with the 
modal fact to which that modal thought corresponds. This is because the modal fact has threshold 
                                                 
14 Another direction of the argument is this. Since modal thoughts are legitimate objects of acquaintance, let us call 
the kind of acquaintance we have with them ‘modal acquaintance’. Modal thoughts always correspond to category-1 
modal facts in such a manner that the latter exclusively constitute the former. Thus, when we are modally acquainted 
with modal thoughts, by the correspondence of modal thoughts to modal facts, we are also modally acquainted with 
category-1 modal facts. As such, cross-world duplication vis-à-vis conserve acquaintance. 
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in John’s world. Could John have wrongly believed, so that there is no world in which a 
counterpart-longifolia is five feet tall? No. If we accept that there are infinitely many worlds, 
then it is unfounded to claim John’s belief is not satisfied in at least one of these world (more on 
this in section 4.4.4). If John may not have wrongly believed, then John’s modal acquaintance 
which justifies his modal belief may not necessarily be active during the conversational episode 
wherein John said the actual-longifolia could have been five feet tall. Since acquaintance yields 
non-inferential and infallible justification, John is not just justified in believing that Pj, he is also 
non-inferentially and infallibly justified. 
4.4.2 Threshold and necessity 
Recombination is not always symmetrical. We work from counterpart relation through 
duplication to recombination. Lewis states; “I deny that the counterpart relation is always 
symmetrical, but surely it often is”.15 Given that counterparts differ from duplicates only because 
they have extrinsic properties, which duplicates lack, we can say counterpart relation supervenes 
on duplicate relation, in that there can be no difference of any sort in one without there being a 
difference of the same sort in the other. Thus, it follows that duplicate relation is also not-always 
symmetrical. But there is recombination with which duplicate relation also supervenes, and if 
duplicate relation and counterpart relation supervene, then recombination and counterpart 
relation supervene, for supervenience is a transitive relation. In this way, recombination becomes 
also a not-always symmetrical relation. By saying recombination is not always symmetrical, I 
mean it is not always the case that when a world supplies at least one of the parts that 
recombined to generate a certain modal object in another world, that the modal object in the 
second world also supplies at least one of the parts that recombined to generate the object16 in the 
first world. This was why the division of modal objects into category-1 and category-2 is relative 
to worlds. The counterpart-longifolia is a catergory-1 modal object relative to our world, but it is 
also a category-2 modal object relative to many other worlds.  
 For necessities, recombination is always symmetrical. It is always the case that when a 
world supplies the parts that recombined to generate a necessity in another world, that the 
necessity in the second world also supplies the parts that recombined to generate the same 
necessity in the first world. Recombination for necessities is not just symmetrical; it is also 
transitive. If there is a third world, and the parts that recombined to generate the same necessity 
in that world were supplied by the second world, then we can say the first world also supply the 
same parts. This is because transitivity allows us to make such inference since the first world 
supplies the parts that generated the same necessity in the second world. In addition, since 
recombination for necessity is in the first place symmetrical, then it is not just the case that the 
first world supplies the parts that recombined to generate the necessity in the third world, but 
also that the third world supplies the parts that recombined to generate the same necessity in the 
first world. For any given two worlds therefore, parts of any given necessity in one world 
recombined to generate the same necessity in the other world and vice-versa, and it does not 
                                                 
15 On the Plurality of Worlds, p. 195. 




matter how many worlds are in between these two given worlds.17 Thus, Recombination for 
necessities forms a circular chain that connects every world in epistemic space due its symmetry 
and transitivity. 
 Since threshold is a function of recombination, it is easy to see how recombination yields 
threshold for necessities. A circular chain that connects every world in epistemic space has 
already been constructed for how recombination generates necessities, so that when we think of a 
necessity, we have in one swoop, gone through the whole of epistemic space. This is because 
whatever we say about a necessity in that world is ex hypothesi said of every world due to the 
symmetry and transitivity of recombination for necessities. Thus, any given necessity has 
threshold in every world and by that token, it is a category-1 modal fact in every world, more 
precisely, a category-1 necessary fact in every world. This is the difference between possibilities 
and necessities: while possibilities are category-1 modal facts relative only to some worlds, 
necessities are category-1 modal facts relative to all worlds. The temptation to think that 
necessities should not be limited to the division of modal facts into category-1 and category-2 is 
a compelling one, but it should be resisted. This is because necessary falsehoods are necessities 
in their own rights. They are not true in any possible worlds, thus, necessary falsehoods are 
category-2 modal facts relative to all worlds.18 
 We have modal thoughts concerning metaphysical necessities and these modal thoughts 
are true when they correspond to category-1 necessary facts. If an object of thought is a 
necessity, then our modal thoughts about that necessity is always true because they will always 
correspond to that category-1 necessary fact: there is no room for error.19 When we are directly 
aware of our modal thoughts about necessities, we say we are modally acquainted with the 
category-1 necessary facts, with which our modal thoughts correspond. Since acquaintance 
yields non-inferential and infallible justification and we are now modally acquainted with 
metaphysical necessities, then we are justified when we have knowledge of metaphysical 
necessities. Let us consider an example. 
We believe that “necessarily, 3+3=6”. As we proceed, I will refer to “3+3=6” as fact and 
as modal fact; what I mean respectively is that “3+3=6” is true here in our world and also true in 
all possible worlds. Following recombination for necessities, parts of the fact that “3+3=6” in our 
world recombined to generate the modal fact that “3+3=6” in another world w1. Given the 
symmetry and transitivity of recombination for necessities, we have covered the whole of 
epistemic space even if we have before our mind w1. Parts of any given world wn which 
recombined to generate the modal fact that “3+3=6” in w1 also recombined to generate the fact 
                                                 
17 I do not mean that there is a linear arrangement to worlds in epistemic space, or even any arrangement at all. What 
I mean is that, most times, we imagine that there are many worlds and we use the closer than relation to talk about 
these worlds. Thus, once we can use the closer than relation, we can as well use the in-between relation to talk about 
worlds that are in-between two worlds, which are less close to each other. 
18 There may be impossible worlds and in these worlds, such necessary falsehoods may be true. But to the extent to 
which LMR is agnostic towards impossible worlds, I need not bother with them here. Nonetheless, see, Yagisawa 
(1988), Vander Laan (1997) Zalta (1997) and Jago (2013) for discussions on impossible worlds. 
19 In fact, the implication of this position, which is one I am willing to stand by, is that there is no room for error 
even when it comes to metaphysical possibilities. Once we can conceive it as a possibility, then, to the extent to 
which possibilities are not of our own making and to the extent to which epistemic possibility entails metaphysical 




that “3+3=6” in our world. This is because the modal fact that ‘3+3=6” in w1 recombined to 
generate the fact that “3+3=6” in our world. In addition, by the symmetry of recombination for 
necessities, parts of “3+3=6” in w1 recombined to generate the modal fact that “3+3=6” in wn, 
and parts of the fact that “3+3=6” in our world recombined to generate the modal fact that 
“3+3=6” in w1 and wn. Thus, our modal thought that “3+3=6” correspond to the category-1 
modal fact that “3+3=6” in w1 and ex hypothesi in every other world. Thus, we are not just 
modally acquainted with the modal fact in w1, we are also modally acquainted with the modal 
fact that “3+3=6” in all other worlds. 
4.4.3 Threshold and other accounts of modal epistemology 
Amongst the recent responses to the ‘How We Know’ question, the most straightforwardly in 
support of the threshold thesis are the conceivability theories. Earlier, in the definition of 
threshold, it was stipulated that in any world, threshold determines the classification of modal 
facts into category-1 and category-2, and that category-2 modalities are beyond the cognitive 
discernment of rational subjects, in whatever way imaginable and possible. The argument was 
that relative to our world, we would not be able to describe category-2 modal facts, however hard 
we tried because they do not have threshold in our world. The direct implication of this is that 
the threshold of category-1 modal facts in our world accounts for our cognitive capacity to 
conceive and imagine them. We may say this is no argument in that what it says can also trivially 
be said about other the counterfactual and understanding theories mutatis mutandis. We can 
easily say the threshold of category-1 modal facts also accounts for our cognitive capacity to 
counterfactually reason and to determinately understand them. But we do not resort to 
counterfactual reasoning or understanding in the formation of modal judgements, beliefs and 
thoughts as we resort to conceivability and/or imaginability. Shalkowski (1996) puts it better, 
“certainly, conceivability, broadly construed, plays an important role in forming modal 
judgements. It is hard to see how we could get started on the modal enterprise without it”.20 We 
are naturally inclined to say we have modal knowledge because we can conceive or imagine 
modal situations and this natural inclination is owed to the threshold of modal facts in our world.    
Counterfactuals are statements whose truth is evaluated in possible worlds. 
Counterfactuals are constructed by picking situations that could have happened in our world, and 
theoretically constructing a distinct situation out from them. For example, when Williamson says 
“had the bush been absent, the rock sliding down the mountainside would have ended up in the 
river”, what he did was to pick a situation – the absence of the bush – that could have happened 
in our world, and theoretically constructed a distinct situation – the rolling of the rock into the 
river – out from it. Stated succinctly, this is how counterfactuals are constructed: (i) the 
antecedent of a counterfactual requires an actual event as its foundation-event, (ii) the 
foundation-event is then negated, (iii) the negated-event becomes the antecedent of the 
counterfactual and (iv) a distinct situation called the consequent is theoretically constructed from 
the antecedent. In the above example, the foundation-event is “the presence of the bush”, which 
is an actual event. This foundation-event was then negated as “the absence of the bush”. The 
                                                 
20 Conventions, Cognitivism and Necessity, 1996, p. 282. 
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negated-event becomes the antecedent of the counterfactual. Lastly, a distinct situation – the 
rolling of the rock into the river – is theoretically constructed from the antecedent as the 
consequent of the counterfactual. Since counterfactuals are evaluated in possible worlds, actual 
events are not the foundation-events of counterfactuals. What can be negated are the duplicates 
of actual events. Thus, the foundation-event is in essence a duplicate of the actual event and not 
the actual event itself. Given that threshold is a function of duplication, the threshold of 
counterfactuals in our world are their foundation-events.  
To decide whether the understanding theories will or will not support the threshold thesis; 
we need to take a closer look at one of the understanding theories. The central theme among the 
understanding theories is that we can have modal knowledge if we understand the concepts used 
in modal statements. Take Bealer’s own example. For all Bealer’s careful and systematic 
analysis, it was found wanting in that modal facts or concepts whose conceptual designations we 
can determinately understand, are all and only those we have had some quasi or real epistemic 
relations with what the least similar thing to them designates. We also made the supposition that 
the member of the ‘-gon’ family, with which the woman in Bealer’s example had had a quasi or 
real experiential relations with was ‘octagon’. Under this supposition, it follows that multigon 
was generated from the duplicate of octagon, and since threshold is a function of duplication, 
then the duplicate of octagon from which multigon was generated is the threshold of multigon in 
our world.  
4.4.4 Threshold and available information 
Threshold is not an epistemic property; it is an ontological property, which enables modal facts 
enter epistemic relations with rational subjects. Threshold flows from modal facts to modal 
thoughts and not the other way round. Threshold is not a fixed property of modal facts; it is 
relative to available information. Barwise (1997) provides a detailed analysis on the 
interdependency between information and possibilities.21 According to Barwise, “the correct 
elimination of any non-empty set of possibilities corresponds to a strict increase in the 
information available at the next stage in the investigation…Conversely, the acquisition of any 
new information corresponds to a strict decrease in the states that are possible”.22 Before 
continuing, it is important to reiterate the tacit difference between alien possibilities and 
impossibilities for they are also affected by the increase in available information.  
Alien possibilities are category-2 modal facts relative to some worlds in that they lack 
threshold in some world, whereas, impossibilities are category-2 modal facts relative to all 
worlds in that they lack threshold in every world. While it is true that the acquisition of new 
information corresponds to a strict decrease in possibilities, only the set of alien possibilities 
decreases when available information increases. The set of impossibilities do not decrease as 
available information increases. For any decrease in the set of impossibilities, epistemic space 
needs to be expanded to include non-epistemic space.23 On the contrary, Barwise thinks the non-
                                                 
21 He thinks the Lewisian extreme realism is not an adequate framework for his informationalism, thus, he opted for 
the Stalnakerian moderate realism. The aspect of his theory that appears here are those that presents better the 
interdependence between information and possibilities. 
22 Barwise, ‘Information and Impossibilities’, 1997, p. 12. 
23 See, Bjerring, Non-Ideal Epistemic Spaces, 2010, Ph.D. thesis, for a detailed analysis on how to achieve this. 
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empty set of impossibilities increases when available information increase. In his view, 
impossibilities are those states that are incompatible with the currently available information.24 
There is no conflict in Barwise’s (and in many other philosophers’ who thinks information 
restricts impossibilities) account and mine in that while he (and those philosophers) is on an 
epistemological task with his informationalism, I am on an ontological one with threshold.  
 As earlier said, we do not have any grasp of alien possibilities and as such, it is expected 
that whatever seems incompatible with the currently available information is referred to as an 
impossibility. This is correct, epistemically, that is, when we are determining what is possible for 
a subject s. Determining what possibility subject s can know, impossibilities do not become 
possible even when available information increase, for whatever is impossible is impossible 
simpliciter. Rather, what become possible are alien possibilities, which turn out to have threshold 
in our world contrary to what we earlier thought given the available information at the time. 
Remember that unlike informationalism (and other epistemological accounts of possibility) 
which arguably flows from modal thoughts to modal facts, threshold flows from modal facts to 
modal thoughts. Thus, whatever happens to us here, whether or not the available information 
increases, the ontological status of modal facts stays the same. Possibilities do not become 
impossibilities, and impossibilities do not become possibilities. Rather, alien possibilities 
become possibilities and possibilities remain possibilities.  
In addition, since threshold is a relative matter, the increase in available information 
corresponds to the increase in the number of modal facts that have threshold in our world. 
Suppose n number of modal facts have threshold in our world. At time t1, the available 
information i may only enable subject s have modal thoughts about n-10 modal facts. At t2, when 
the available information increases to i+1, s would now have modal thoughts about n-9 modal 
facts. At t3, i+2, and s would now have modal thoughts about n-8 modal facts. This will go on 
until i is saturated and can no longer increase, and even when that happens, n will still not have 
been exhausted. Thus, while increase in available information decreases possibility and 
increases impossibility for an epistemological account; increase in available information should 
increase possibility and decrease alien possibility for an ontological account. Concerning the 
availability of information at any time, Barwise states, “what information is available at any 
point in an inquiry is a context-sensitive matter, depending on the kind of possibility one is 
considering and on the progress of inquiry up to that point”.25 Thus, having satisfied the 
conditions for increase in available information, and if there is an increase in the available 
information, then category-1 modal facts increases and category-2 modal facts decreases. 
If we expand epistemic space to include non-epistemic space so as to make room for 
impossible worlds, then we can make sense of modal thoughts about impossibilities. However, as 
said earlier in note 18, I need not bother with impossibilities here and now because LMR is 
agnostic concerning impossible worlds. Thus, if epistemic space is not expanded, then 
impossibilities are not modal facts to the extent to which they are not true in any possible world. 
Since threshold flows from modal facts to modal thoughts, then it suffices to say impossibilities 
do not have threshold anywhere in epistemic space, hence, their status as category-2 modal facts 
relative to all worlds in epistemic space. If as I have claimed, we can have modal thoughts 
                                                 
24 Barwise, 1997, p. 12. 
25 Barwise, ‘Information and Impossibilities’, 1997, p. 12. 
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because the modal facts with which our modal thoughts correspond are those that have threshold 
in our world, then what do we have when we claim we are thinking about impossibilities? I think 
most times; we make modal errors when we claim we are thinking about impossibilities. 
4.4.5 Threshold and modal error 
When we make modal errors we wrongly believe that a given modal belief is true. Modal beliefs 
are true when they are satisfied in some possible worlds. Thus, under this notion, a modal belief 
is false if and only if, the belief is not satisfied in any possible world. Another way to explain 
modal error is to say we make modal error when our modal thought fails to correspond to any 
modal fact. Let us continue with the second way. A very useful example used by Yablo (1993) to 
explain modal error is the Kripkean case of Hesperus and Phosphorus. Yablo explained that the 
ancients might have imagined Hesperus outlasting Phosphorus, perhaps, because they were 
unaware of the fact that Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same planet. If an ancient had 
imagined Hesperus outlasting Phosphorus and so judged it possible for Hesperus to outlast 
Phosphorus, he or she, Yablo claims, have made a modal error. That is, the modal thought that 
Hesperus could outlast Phosphorus does not correspond to any modal fact, that is, there is no 
possible world where Hesperus outlasts Phosphorus.  
There are two ways in which we can analyse modal error and threshold. Firstly, being in 
modal error is an epistemic state and to the extent to which possibility is a pragmatic matter,26 I 
find it unsatisfactory to say anyone who believed like the ancients may have believed, has made 
a modal error. What if, the believer had agreed to disregard the necessity of identity, which 
makes Hesperus necessarily the same object as Phosphorus? Until, we are certain of the relevant 
issues with which we are relativizing possibility, all issues about modal errors should be 
suspended. Secondly, most times, we give metaphysical possibility a privileged ontological 
status. This is because we often say whatever exists in a possible world, does so because it is 
metaphysically possible. Under this notion, if subject s makes a modal error when he thinks it 
possible that Hesperus outlasts Phosphorus then it is metaphysically impossible for Hesperus to 
outlast Phosphorus. Consequently, a subject s only makes a modal error when his thought 
concerns impossibilities. To the extent to which impossibilities do not have threshold in any 
world in epistemic space, a subject s can make modal errors because his modal thoughts fails to 
correspond to any modal fact. Under the threshold analysis therefore, modal errors cannot be 
made with possibilities or necessities for they always correspond to category-1 modal facts. 
Modal errors can also not be made with alien possibilities since we do not have any grasp of 
them. Modal errors can only be made with impossibilities. 
I have no idea what we think (or believe) when we claim to be thinking about 
impossibilities (or that such and such is impossible). This is because I fail to see how such 
thought or belief would be determinately descriptive. Roughly, a belief is descriptive when its 
content is not generic but particular. A belief content is generic when it is of the form; “s 
believes that p”. Whereas, a belief content is particular when it is of the form; “s believes that p 
is of such and such character”, and only particular beliefs can be determinately or 
                                                 
26 See, Stalnaker, Inquiry, 1981. 
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indeterminately descriptive. A particular belief is determinately descriptive if we can on first 
appearance, discern all there is to discern about it. A particular belief is indeterminately 
descriptive when we cannot on first appearance, discern all there is to discern about it. It is easy 
to see then that “John believes that Pj” is particular and determinately descriptive in that John 
knows on first appearance, all there is to know about Pj. He knows that the tree is a longifolia 
(and all that comes with being a longifolia), that it is five feet tall (contingent facts), that it is in 
Jerry’s garden and that an electricity cable passes some few meters away from it (extrinsic facts), 
etc. Thus, possibilities are determinate in an atomic sense, that is, they explicitly mean what on 
first appearance, we can discern from them. Necessities too are determinate in this sense. We 
know all there is to know about necessities in that we know that for any whatever, if the 
whatever had held, any necessity would still have held. It suffices to conclude then that we are 
epistemically omniscient when we have beliefs about possibilities and necessities. However, 
with impossibilities, we are not so epistemically omniscient because beliefs about impossibilities 
can only be indeterminately descriptive.  
At best, we are only quasi epistemically omniscient when we have beliefs about 
impossibilities. For example, consider “3+3≠6”. What do we think, believe or know when we 
consider “3+3≠6”? I really do not know, but I know this: what remains unintelligible and 
unexplainable when we consider “3+3≠6”, outweighs what would be intelligible and explainable. 
Surely, we do not on first appearance, discern all there is to discern about impossibilities, in 
which case, they are not determinate in an atomic sense. In addition, I sincerely doubt whether 
on any rational reflection, which may be higher than a first appearance approximation, those 
aspects of impossibilities, which remained unintelligible and unexplainable would become 
intelligible and explainable. This is precisely the reason we are only quasi epistemically 
omniscient concerning beliefs about impossibilities. It is safe to conclude then that (i) 
impossibilities are trivially opaque on first appearance and (ii) non-trivially opaque upon rational 
reflection. The truth of (i) lies in the fact that impossibilities are not determinate in an atomic 
sense. (ii) explains why I sincerely doubted that any rational reflection would make intelligible 
and explainable those aspects of our beliefs concerning impossibilities that were unintelligible 
and unexplainable. 
 The view that we are only quasi epistemically omniscient concerning beliefs about 
impossibilities is grounded in the exportation principle which Lewisian worlds obey. According 
to the principle, “if world w represents something as being an F, then something is an F. For […] 
w contains an F as a part. And as w is part of the totality of being, that particular F too is part of 
the totality of being: so something is an F”.27 Now, suppose we allow impossible worlds. We 
would have to accept that given the exportation principle, we can export anything from 
impossible worlds, that is, anything is part of reality. Suppose we represent the impossibility 
“3+3≠6” as Fx, and any arbitrary sentence G, such that we have GΛFx in an impossible world w'. 
Absurdly (either by classical or paraconsistent logic), the exportation of Fx entails the truth of G 
simpliciter. Thus, impossibilities are non-trivially opaque upon rational reflection because they 
                                                 
27 Jago, ‘Impossible Worlds’, p. 717. 
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entail the truth of any sentence. To the extent to which we do not take into consideration all 
formable and constructible sentences when we have beliefs about impossibilities, not even 
rational reflection can make every aspect of a belief about impossibility intelligible and 
explainable.  
The case of alien possibilities is straightforward. We simply are incapable of forming 
descriptive beliefs about them because our beliefs content about them is generic, that is non-
descriptive. This is because, the best we can say about alien possibilities is, “we believe that 
there are alien possibilities”. As such, we cannot make modal errors when we form beliefs about 
alien possibilities. This is not because we are always correct when we have beliefs about alien 
possibilities, rather, it is because our beliefs about alien possibilities lack the content that can be 
true or false. Only descriptive beliefs can be true or false, that is, we can only say such and such 
beliefs is true in possible worlds when we know precisely what those beliefs describe, and beliefs 
about alien possibilities are not descriptive since their content is generic. 
Generally, therefore, modal errors can only occur when a belief content is descriptive. 
Thus, since we only have descriptive beliefs with possibilities, necessities and impossibilities, we 
can make modal errors only with possibilities, necessities and impossibilities. However, while 
possibilities and necessities are determinately descriptive, impossibilities are indeterminately 
descriptive. As a result of their determinate descriptiveness, our beliefs about possibilities and 
necessities are always true in that we are epistemically omniscient about them and can satisfy 
that they are verified by possible worlds. Whereas, as a result of their indeterminate 
descriptiveness, our beliefs about impossibilities are not always true in that we are only quasi 
epistemically omniscient about them and cannot satisfy that they are verified by possible worlds 
(or even impossible worlds). Since our beliefs about impossibilities are not always true, they 
could be true or false and when they are false, we make modal errors when we hold such beliefs.  
4.5 Conclusion 
MA1:  We have modal knowledge. 
MA2: Taking modal scepticism seriously involves presenting an account of modal 
epistemology. 
MA3: We have such accounts in the conceivability theories of Yablo and Chalmers; the 
counterfactual theories of Williamson and Hill; and in the understanding theory of 
Bealer. 
MA4: Acquaintance is fundamental to our cognitive faculties such that that every 
proposition intelligible to us are composed wholly of constituents with which we 
are acquainted, for a constituent with which we are not acquainted is 
unintelligible to us. 
MA5: Any knowledge claim acquired in the manner described by MA4, is non-
inferentially and infallibly justified. 
MA6: By MA4, modal knowledge needs to be grounded in acquaintance because modal 
propositions are intelligible to us. 
MA7:  Possible worlds are causally and spatiotemporally isolated from us. 
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MA8:  For MA6 to hold, MA7 needs to be conserved. 
MA9:  None of the accounts of modal epistemology mentioned in MA3 conserves MA7.  
MA10:  Only modal acquaintance conserves MA7 since it incorporates threshold. 
MA11: From MA5 and MA10, modal acquaintance provides an account of modal 
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